Journal of Administration Overseas

VOLUME XVIII · NUMBER 1
JANUARY 1979

price £1.10 quarterly net
annual subscription including postage £4.88

MINISTRY OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT · HMSO

This Journal is published for the Ministry of Overseas Development. It aims at providing a medium for the exchange of information about administration at all levels, whether in local government or in the organization of central departments. It also covers land tenure. Nothing in the Journal should be read as necessarily representing official views or policy unless this is specifically stated. The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in signed articles rests with the authors. The Editor is Peter Johnston who is Administrative Officer with the Development Planning Unit, Bartlett School of Architecture and Planning, University College London.

NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles for publication in the Journal from serving officers and others with knowledge and experience in the field covered by the Journal are welcome and should be addressed to the Editorial Office, Bilateral Aid and Rural Development Department, Ministry of Overseas Development, Room A516, Eland House, Stag Place, Victoria, London SW1E 5DH.

Books for review, reports and communications for the Editor should be similarly addressed.

Twenty off-prints are supplied free of charge on request to contributors whose articles are published. Requests for off-prints should be made at the time articles are submitted. Off-prints in excess of twenty are charged for at a rate relative to the length of the article.

Orders and subscriptions should be sent to Her Majesty's Stationery Office at the addresses given below.

The Government does not accept responsibility for any of the private or trade advertisements included in this publication.

ALL correspondence for the Journal of Administration Overseas should be addressed to the Editor at the address shown above, and *not* to Her Majesty's Stationery Office at Atlantic House, London EC1P 1BN.

Published by
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
49 High Holborn, London WC1V 6HB
13a Castle St, Edinburgh EH2 3AR
41 The Hayes, Cardiff CF1 1JW
Brazennose St, Manchester M60 8AS
Southey House, Wine Street, Bristol BS1 2BQ
258 Broad St, Birmingham B1 2HE
80 Chichester St, Belfast BT1 4JY
or through booksellers
Price £1.10 net, annual subscription including postage, £4.88

Journal of Administration Overseas

CONTENTS

Editor's Notes 3

Policy-Making in Nigerian Public Administration 4
Augustus Adebayo

The Nigerian Land Use Decree of 1978 15
Ifebueme Okpala

Urban Planning in Nigeria 22
Harry A Green

The Count-Down to Civil Rule in Nigeria 34
A Akinsanya

The Ibadan Comfort Stations Programme 46
David Pasteur

Quarterly Notes 59

Book Reviews 62
by *Harold Caustin, Professor A S Livingstone, Raymond Nottage, Colin Fuller, Sir William Dale, Peter Canham, Charles Young, A H M Kirk-Greene*

Book Notes 77

© *Crown copyright* 1979

ISBN 0 11 724729 4

ISSN 0021-8472

Editor's Notes

'Where Africa's sunny fountains roll down their golden sand'
(Reginald Heber)

This is the first time that we have published an issue which has focused all the articles on a single country. We have enjoyed a long connection with Nigeria and in recent years an increasing number of Nigerian contributors have joined the long list of expatriates who have provided material from Africa's most populous Commonwealth country, so it seems appropriate for Nigeria to be the subject state for this issue.

Augustus Adebayo pulls no punches in his shrewd assessment of the power of Civil Service influence in policy-making notwithstanding the 'Supremeness' of the Military Council. The working of 'government by laughter' will surely be a revelation to most readers. Dr Okpala makes a frank examination of the recent Land Use Decree which, in effect, as he sees it, nationalises all land in Nigeria; but which will not achieve its social desiderata unless 'it is implemented in favour of the common good' rather that to further the interests of those who are already in privileged positions. Harry Green, who has had long experience in the country finds that unlike most other Third World States, Nigeria has a national urban policy structure and a special Ministry for urban affairs, yet has so far failed to evolve 'co-ordination at the top for implementation below' (of urban planning). The criticism is constructive and he proposes the development of 'urban polyarchy' as the solution most likely to prove effective.

Dr Akinsanya looks at the emerging new Civil constitution for his country, seeks out the problems which would face the Constituent Assembly and suggests the safeguards needed in his view, if the new constitution is to succeed – 'we cannot create a nation by constitutional engineering, we can only create one by getting rid of ignorance, poverty and disease', as he puts it.

Finally David Pasteur looks at the health problems of Ibadan from the managerial or administrative viewpoint rather than that of health engineering. Perhaps the 'Comfort Stations' Programme which he describes offers a means of improving the urban squalor of so many large African cities which should be studied and adopted elsewhere.

We shall be very glad to hear from any of our readers whether or not they consider we should provide further issues concentrating on a single country or perhaps on a particular region.

Policy-making in Nigerian Public Administration 1960-1975

AUGSTUS ADEBAYO*

Introduction

Policy-making in Nigerian public administration from Independence in 1960 until the take-over by the Military in January 1966 was largely in the hands of civil servants. This was due to the very nature of politics and the political circumstances of the country. Under the military from 1966 to 1975, the states came under the hegemony of autocratic military governors who kept policy in their own hands. The basis of decision-making was often dictated by private interest and consideration and by the influence of personal friends outside the governmental machinery. This development is to be traced, in the main, to the belief by the military that responsibility for the success or failure of the administration rested solely on them. The homogeneous nature of the socio-political and cultural formation in most of the states favoured and facilitated the concentration of authority in one hand. In the Federal Government, the reverse was the case. The lack of socio-political cohesion at the centre produced a governmental machinery of loose structure. This again produced divergent and sometimes conflicting political power-base for the various public functionaries.

This situation afforded a good opportunity for the civil servants to get hold of the weak government machine and to exert their influence over policy-making. By becoming the dominant influence in policy-making, the Federal civil servants merely proved right the hypothesis that in the presence of a weak political will, administration will create devices to enable it to function without the direction of the political will.

The aim of this article is to examine the relative role of politicians and administrators in the realms of policy and decision-making. Politics and politicians here are used to denote the action of rulers in the control and direction of government. 'Rulers' is used in the sense of politicians in government who take responsibility for the direction of governmental departments and machinery. In a military setting, the term 'rulers' will normally apply to the Military Governors, the Supreme Military Council and other military functionaries and institutions established by

*Mr Adebayo is a lecturer in Public Administration at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

the military to play the political role. Administrators in this article denote the permanent officials, the permanent secretaries and the hierarchy of officials who serve in various departments of government.

Policy is decision-making. John Pfiffner summed it up that the proper sphere of politics (or policy) is the 'determination, crystallization and declaration of the will of the community' and that the role of administration 'is the carrying into effect of this will once it has been made clear by political processes'.[1] The convention is that responsibility for policy rests with the political chief executive in the department. He is expected to set the broad lines of policy to be pursued. As Peter Self[2] puts it, his role is that of climate setting in deciding the way certain particular issues are to be approached. The administrator, on the other hand, is the instrument through which the policy is carried out. This is why Herbert Morrison[3] stressed that the administrator whould be the instrument and not the master of policy and Charles Christie[4] concluded that administration is the hand-maid of policy.

The point of the situational descriptions above is to show that it is the role of the politician to control the administrator and the administrative system. The political boss can exercise this control in several ways – by giving continual political guide-lines for the administrators to follow, by ensuring that the administrator faithfully carries out laid-down policies and by ensuring that he is in a position to overrule the decisions of the administrators.

Nigerian Experience, 1960-1965

In Nigeria and no doubt this is equally true of other developing countries, the crucial issue is the extent to which the political boss in a Department lays down guide-lines for the administrators to follow. Ministerial experience in Nigeria, particularly during the civilian regime, has not largely followed the path of the conventional relation between the political boss and his Permanent Secretary. There have certainly been a few cases here and there, where the political boss exercised his right and discharged his duty of giving leadership and laying down political guide-lines for the department. In the main, however, it is true to say that for most of the time the administration has been left to its own devices. To this extent, the convention that the Minister is the master and the administrator the instrument of policy has not been strictly applicable to public administration in Nigeria. Very often it has been the administrator who has been both the master and the instrument of policy.

This peculiar situation is evidenced in several ways. The "average" politician, especially in the civilian regime, conceived his role as approving or disapproving

---

[1]John M. Pfiffner: *Public Administration*, The Ranald Press Company, 1935.
[2]Peter Self: *Administrative Theories and Politics*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1972.
[3]Herbert Morrison: *Socialisation and Transport*, London, 1933.
[4]Charles Christie: "A note on Administrative Principle", in *Public Administration*. Jan., 1932.

whatever proposals or recommendations were placed before him by his Permanent Secretary. He expected the permanent Secretary to think out the policy himself and submit it to him for approval. The writer recalls a few interesting instances. In one case, the writer telephoned a Minister to ask for a meeting to discuss some urgent affairs of State. The Minister replied that it would all depend on whether there was anything awaiting him in his in-tray the next morning. At about 9 a.m. he telephoned the writer and said that there had been no work for him in his in-tray and he was ready for the meeting. In another case, a State Commissioner asked urgently to see the writer on an important issue. When he came, he complained that his permanent secretary was inefficient and pressed that he should be removed to some other department. When the Commissioner was asked to substantiate his accusation, his only ground was that for about four consecutive days no single file had entered his (the Commissioner's) in-tray and that he had sat at his desk all day for four days with nothing to do. 'After all,' he concluded 'I am not paid merely to come to the office to read newspapers and drink tea'.

Reasons Adduced for the Situation

One may well wonder why in Nigeria and perhaps also in some other developing countries the majority of political heads of departments have not been able to function effectively in the conventional role of makers of policy. The reasons are not far to seek. In the first place, some individuals with very limited educational background have emerged as Ministers or Commissioners. It is no exaggeration to say that some of these politicians have been little better than illiterates. This situation was especially true during the civilian regime. Their notion of ministerial appointment and responsibility was that of a ceremonial head in a department whose only duty was to wear costly apparels to office, and to sit back and wait for any files to come from the permanent secretary for his approval. When such files do not flow in, he begins to suspect disloyalty or inefficiency on the part of his officials. If on the other hand, he has an assiduous permanent secretary with an analytical mind and a flair for setting out his ideas in long beautiful prose, the result would still be the same. After the near-illiterate Minister had laboriously gone through the first three pages of his permanent secretary's submission, without comprehending what it was all about, he would throw the file aside in anger and conclude that all the long submissions were a calculated attempt to bedevil the whole issue and prevent him from getting to the truth of what was going on in the department.

Or take the case of the Minister whose permanent secretary made a well-reasoned submission running to five or six foolscap pages and concluded by submitting three alternative courses of action for the Minister to consider and decide on one for implementation. The poor semi-literate Minister who could not make head or tail out of his permanent secretary's submission, but at the same time wanted to hide his ignorance minuted back to his permanent secretary, 'I agree with you; please proceed'. But with what has he agreed? Another similar Minister who lost his temper after laboriously wading through the first three pages without understanding what it was all about, minuted back 'I do not agree with you' without giving any reason and without offering his own solution. In both cases

the Ministers have abdicated their role as masters of policy and left their officials with nothing but frustration.

Whichever way the inadequacy of a Minister manifests itself, the result is all the same. He is unable to guide and control policy in his Department. The consequence is that such a situation leaves no alternative but for the permanent secretary to manage its affairs himself.

The distrust of officials by some ministers owing to the latter's lack of an adequate educational background also manifests itself in other ways. When the Minister raises proposals which involve expenditure the magnitude of which is clearly beyond the limits that the Treasury or Government will approve or even consider, he just cannot understand the notion that funds are not available. He believes, with the generality of the less informed masses, that since it is Government that prints and mints the money there can be no question of government not being able to find money for any project. A permanent secretary's advice under these circumstances that the expenditure sought is unrealistic is then taken as a determined attempt to be un-cooperative. Again the Minister attributes this to ethnic differences or the fact that an official's political sympathies lie in an opposite camp to his own.

Another reason for this failure to act decisively is to be found in the fact that most of the political department bosses are so immersed in constituency squabbles and pressures that there is hardly any time left to spare for really getting to grips with work in the department, let alone laying down guide-lines. In a society ridden with poverty and ignorance, the Minister is regarded by his constituents as the fountain of largesse and bounty. At any given moment when the Minister is in the office there is a sizeable crowd waiting to see him.

They are people from his constituency, most of whom require assistance in one form or the other – financial assistance for some to pay their children's school fees; assistance to secure membership of the local customary court; to bail some relation from police custody; to be registered as a contractor or a licensed buying agent; to fix scores of people in clerical appointments and a host of other forms of assistance too numerous to mention. There are those from home who have come in post-haste to let the Minister know that his political opponent has been busy spreading false reports about him and was appearing to be gaining ground. The Minister must come with them immediately to put an end to the 'lies' of his opponent. On the whole, it is no exaggeration to say that the average Minister should really be an object of sympathy. He dare not turn his supplicants away and yet he has no means of meeting their various requests. The spectacle in his house is infinitely worse. There he hosts a crowd of people every day. Some are staying with him until he is able to grant some request; there are also those depending on him to fix them up in various appointments and will be his guest until he succeeds in doing this. Amidst all these, what time is left to study departmental papers, let alone to lay down policy guide-lines?

This sort of situation leaves no alternative but for the permanent secretary to

take the initiative in running the Ministry. After all, as Herbert Morrison[1] once remarked, it is better that a department should be run by its civil servants than that it should not be run at all!

The irony of it is that the permanent secretary who steps into the vacuum created by his ineffective Minister is at once labelled as over-powerful and 'super-permanent' by members of the public and the local press.

Then quite apart from the question of the personal deficiencies or drawbacks afflicting some of the political heads of departments during the civil regime, there was the pattern of decision-making inherent in the system which gave civil servants the initiative in decision-making. Take, for example, the preparation of the annual estimates. A Budget constitutes the work-programme of a Government for a given period of time – a year or two or five years. It is, therefore, a collection of decisions on which government performance is to be based during a given period. The fact is that the preparation of the budget was an exercise conducted almost entirely by the civil servants.

Annually, the 'call circular' issues from the Treasury requesting all departments to commence preparing their draft estimates for the following year. These are submitted to the Treasury in the form of 'Advance Proposals'; the Treasury scrutinises them, makes its own 'Strictures' and returns them to the various departments for re-submission in the form of draft estimates. It is at this stage that the draft estimates go before the Cabinet or sometimes to a Committee of the Cabinet which meets as the Treasury Board. The main issue before this forum, is to give each department an opportunity to confront the Treasury officials and argue its case for an increase in the votes reduced by the Treasury officials. Not infrequently, the members of the Cabinet who are political bosses, raise fundamental issues on the budget and insert programmes or projects which were not originally included. But by and large, the draft budget which goes before the legislature for passage into law is the handiwork of civil servants both as to its contents and its formulation. This accounts for why Ministers in great panic lobby their colleagues in Finance and Works Departments after the Estimates have been virtually finalised. It also accounts for the high incidence of supplementary estimates passed annually. The ruling political bosses discover during the year that projects and programmes of vital interest to the Government and party in power were not included in the budget; these are then tacked on piece-meal during the year. The net effect is that a sizeable portion of the programmes elaborately prepared in the Budget were often not touched and the Budget becomes a mere exercise in futility and window-dressing.

Thus the political situation in Nigeria was such that a favourable situation was created for civil servants to gain a strong foothold in policy-making during the period between Independence and the military take-over. Taking the Regions first; each of the Regions had come to be dominated by a strong party government

[1]Herbert Morrison: *op cit.*

since regionalization in 1954. The enthusiasm and dynamic drive which motivated each party that came to power had produced strong and virile governments which were masters in their own homes both as to policy and the substance of government. Therefore between regionalization in 1954 and the threshold of Independence in 1959, the political masters in the Regions were indeed masters of policy and dictated both the pace and the direction of Government. The introduction of Free Primary Education in the Western Region at the time, the reforms in the local Government system in the Eastern Region, the bold measures towards Nigerianization of the Civil Service in the various Regions and a host of other political innovations were all the handiwork of the political party in power in each of the Regions. The Civil Servants played the traditional role of instruments of policy in executing the policy formulated by their political masters.

The pattern and relation of influence on policy-making in the Regions, however, changed from the threshold of Independence until the end of the civil regime in 1965. During this period, the open struggle for Federal power and supremacy among the regionally based political parties had become so tense and bitter that it sapped each party government of all the energy needed to devote to affairs of public administration in the various Regions. It was therefore natural that career administrators should step into the vacuum and exercise increasing influence on policy-making. The memoranda and other policy papers coming before the regional Executive Councils were, in the main, initiated by civil servants.

In the Federal Government during the same period, that is between Independence in 1960 and the Military take-over, the increasing influence of civil servants on policy was also clearly marked, even though the reason for it differed somewhat from that of their counter-parts in the Regions. Under an uneasy coalition government, there was insufficient agreement at the political level to permit the formulating of sustained and consistent policy. It was again natural that civil servants became the mainspring of policy. Administration has a way of taking advantage of weak political control and in the presence of a weak political consensus, administration will always take over and assume control of policy. The dominant role which the Federal permanent secretaries came to play in policy during the military regime until 1975 was a carry-over and confirmation of the influence which they had already established in the civilian era.

Military Regime and Decision-Making, 1966-1975

The nature and pattern of decision-making under the military regime can now be examined. Perhaps the most significant feature is that decision-making came to be highly personalised both at State and at Federal levels. The reason for this is no doubt due to the military's concept of their role in government. From the inception of the military regime in Nigeria, it was basically accepted that the task of running the government was the sole responsibility of the Military and that where Executive Councils had been established, their role was merely advisory. This understanding was given constitutional sanction by the promulgation of Decree No 1 of 1966 which vested all executive powers of the State in the Military Governors. The tacit understanding that the success or failure of the military

administration rested squarely on the Military Governor provided him with justification, if not excuse, to treat official advice and procedural rules and regulations with scant regard.

Rational decision-making is never a one-man affair. In normal day-to-day experience and practice in any organization, final decisions can seldom be attributed to a single individual; officials at different levels contribute to the ultimate decision-making. The process involves the assembly and evaluation of all available data and of the possible consequences of selecting a particular course of action. This sort of exercise is normally beyond the capacity of any single individual.

Decision-Making in Governments – Personal Nature

It was interesting to watch the gradual process by which most of the military rulers progressed from rational decision-makers to absolute dictators, during the period 1966 to 1975. On assumption of office, the military ruler started by being somewhat diffident; he was conscious of the fact that he was new to public administration and the intricacies of governmental bureaucracy. He was anxious to receive advice and he was grateful to officials who furnished him with well-reasoned briefs. By and large, unless it was a matter on which the ruling regime had taken a particular standpoint, the Military Governor carefully considered the advice tendered by his Executive Council or Departmental officials and in most cases acted on their advice.

After being in office for upwards of a year and feeling himself firmly seated in the saddle, he began to spurn the established rules and procedures, both legal and administrative, and tended to become a law unto himself. That was usually the beginning of the road to corruption, and nepotism. The concept that the military regime invested responsibility for the running of government in the military ruler alone was used as a pretext to concentrate all power in his hands alone. Of course, absolute power corrupts absolutely. This situation in a large measure was why some State Governments, during 1966-1975 had as many as seven permanent secretaries concentrated in the office of the Military Governor, at one time or another, responsible to the Governor for almost the entire range of governmental activities – economic, administrative, political, commercial and industrial.

The result was that the departments officially charged with these responsibilities found that their functions had been usurped by the office of the Military Governor; they were often confused and frustrated as they had to fold their arms and await decisions on contracts, economic and industrial ventures handed down to them. The cluster of permanent secretaries in the Governor's Office were themselves not happy because they were not operating at a level and degree of responsibility commensurate with their Status and rank. At best, they were mere conduit pipes – collating information required by the Military Governor and conveying the Governor's decisions to various executive departments for implementation.

With power concentrated in the hands of the Military Governor alone, it could be wondered what the mental process and the decision-making organs were by which he

reached the various decisions culminating in the directives emanating from him. While it cannot be denied that the military ruler will himself sometimes hold strong views on certain matters and come to conclusions from his own deductions and reasoning, yet in the majority of instances, decision-making was influenced and determined by the governor's intimate circle. This group of advisers has been admirably described by Thomas Kanza[1] in his unpublished memoir where he wrote:

> This intimate circle is not necessarily the government, meaning the ministers, secretaries of State or high administrative officials. It is a kind of private court made up of special advisers, confident profiteers and daily or nightly social companions.

As Thomas Kanza rightly concluded, "this new breed of men and women do more to influence the leader's decisions than his ministers or official technical consultants. Because they have unlimited access to the 'boss', these members form a kind of 'invisible arm' of the State, providing their special services in addition to the official ones . . . ".

On the infrequent occasions when some of the military rulers adopted a conventional mode of decision-making by summoning a meeting of all departments, agencies and experts connected with a particular problem in hand for deliberation and advice, the ultimate mode of arriving at a decision would, not unexpectedly, take a somewhat comic turn. Looking around him as each speaker made his contribution, studying the faces and gesticulations of each and somewhat at a loss to sift the burden of the argument, the Governor would finally decide in favour of the speaker who made the greatest impression on him. It was not the quality of argument that won the day, but the power of rhetoric employed.

Federal Military Government: Ascendancy of Officials in Decision-Making

The picture depicted in the foregoing paragraphs applied generally to most of the State governments during the Military regime in Nigeria, between 1966 and 1975. In the Federal Military Government during the same period, the pattern was somewhat different. Here, there was a reversal of the state picture. While permanent secretaries in the States were almost reduced to the status of clerks who enforced the will of the governor and were ordered around according to his whims and caprices, in the Federal Government, the permanent secretaries formed the *fons at origo* of policy and decision-making. One probable reason for this situation was that while government and authority were compact and concentrated in the States, they were diffuse and loose at Federal level. Where there is a jumble of ethnic and tribal interests and considerations, with the political and administrative personnel drawing their strength and inspiration from different and even conflicting sources, administrative machinery and political control is bound to be weak and loose. This was the position in the Federal Government during the first decade of military rule in Nigeria.

---

[1]Quoted in *The Demigods*, by Jean Lacouture. Secker & Warburg, London, 1971. Thomas Kanza was Foreign Minister in the government that succeeded Lumumba's.

As already pointed out, administration has a way of taking advantage of weak political control, and converting it into a source of its own strength. This is particularly so in a State where there is frequent political crisis leading to instability. This, the writer believes, was the reason for the influence which the Federal permanent secretaries exerted on public affairs and the power which they enjoyed. One must not, of course, lose sight of the effect of General Gowon's style of administration as a contributory factor to the dominant influence of federal officials. Perhaps in the anxiety to ensure that every available opinion was obtained before decisions were taken, Gowon encouraged officials to attend meetings of the Federal Executive Council and of the Supreme Military Council and to speak their minds. It was not uncommon for an official to get up and speak after his Commissioner had spoken, and to take an entirely different line – albeit the Commissioner's views were supposed to represent the official departmental stand.

This was in contrast to the practice in the States where officials were not given access to Council meetings. A State Commissioner may at his own discretion invite his official advisers to come with him to Executive Council meeting to assist him in elucidating some technical argument.

Even then such officials were kept outside the Council Chamber and the question of the stage at which they might be invited in to the Council deliberations or whether they would even be invited in at all, was entirely at the discretion of the State Commissioner. Very often the officials would sit idling outside for several hours, only to be informed at the close of Executive Council Session that the matter for which they were invited had been disposed of.

The Federal Permanent Secretaries having assumed a vantage position of influence in public affairs, made sure that they exerted this influence at the very point where it would be most effective. This was on the Head of State himself. Since most of them had free access to him, they utilised this opportunity to canvass their views. They reinforced their stand by strong advocacy at meetings of the Federal Executive Council and Supreme Military Council, to which they were given access. The convention that all memoranda coming before the Supreme Military Council were sponsored by the Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (long-winded title for 'Head of State') facilitated the exertion of pressure on the Head of State, since such pressure was directed to the one and only person who claimed authorship of the proposals to be approved into policy in the various memoranda, and who had the dominant voice in the ultimate process of decision.

This convention holds good no matter the Ministry or Department of government from which the memoranda emanated. When a Ministry had finished preparing its memoranda, it would put the Head of State as the author. The wisdom of this practice is open to serious doubt. In the first place, it causes lobbying to be concentrated on the Head of State who is the President of the Supreme Military Council and makes it easy for 'wire pullers' to seek to influence his decision. In the second place, it made it difficult for the Head of State to keep an open mind

on an issue during debate in Council. Gowon was known to have exploded in anger during debates on memoranda at the Supreme Military Council and to have asked whether his intention in the Memoranda was being doubted or his integrity being called into question. A situation of this nature would not have arisen if he had allowed the Federal Commissioner responsible for the subject-matter of the memorandum to come in and present his memorandum and withdraw after the Supreme Military Council had reached its decision.

Memorandum

Given the type of atmosphere described above, it was not surprising that Gowon hardly suffered the proposals in any Supreme Military Council memorandum to be defeated or substantially amended during debate. The Federal permanent secretaries who had canvassed the proposals in the memoranda were present at Council meetings ready to counter any objections members of Council might make. Even when almost all the members of Council seriously disagreed with the proposals in a Supreme Military Council memorandum, the President, sometimes by cajolery and sometimes by veiled threat, invariably had his way and approved the memorandum and thereby decided the policy to be followed thereon. Sometimes when the President sensed that members of Council felt seriously concerned and agitated over a memorandum and realised that it would be impolitic to ram it down their throats, he diverted their attention by some hilarious joke. While everyone was dissolved in laughter, he quietly approved the memorandum. By the time members were able to restrain their hilarity, they discovered that the President had approved the memorandum under debate – another veritable instance of what Jean Lacouture described as 'government by laughter'.[1]

To cite an illustration of 'government by laughter' the author accompanied his Military Governor to meetings of the Supreme Military Council from 1972 to June 1975. At one of these meetings, in 1974, a Memorandum purported to be sponsored by the Head of State was tabled before the Council. It came from the Federal Ministry of Education and the proposals therein were that the Federal Ministry of Education should come actively into the fields of primary and secondary education throughout the Federation. All Council members were most vehemently opposed to the idea of the Federal Government taking control of primary education in the States. The opposition of all the twelve Military Governors was strongly supported by all the Service heads.

On seeing this unanimous opposition, Gowon sought to persuade the Council by making an impassioned speech extolling the virtues of the proposals in the memorandum. After he thought that he had convinced them, he took a second vote round the Council and discovered that all the members stood firmly in their opposition to the Memorandum. He then caused a diversion by introducing a joke at which all the members were convulsed with laughter. Before they regained their composure, he passed the memorandum as approved by Council. The amazement of members of the Council can best be imagined when they discovered what had

[1]Jean Lacouture: *The Demigods*, Secker & Warburg, London, 1971.

happened during the short interlude of laughter.

And, so, the Supreme Military Council with all its "supremeness" could not change policy formulated by a permanent secretary and already agreed with the Head of State. It is the awareness of the influence of the permanent secretary over policy or decision-making that made Military Governors during Gowon's regime leave their domain and spend the evening with the permanent secretary at his residence in Ikoyi, lobbying for his support over matters that might in due course come before the Supreme Military Council, the Federal Executive Council or even directly before the Head of State.

Conclusion

One may perhaps venture to look into the future. In doing so, one may discard a military regime since it is an aberration, an abnormality in public administration in times when things are out of joint. For future civil regimes in Nigeria, the predominant influence of the administrator over policy will remain for so long as the basis and structure of politics in developing countries retain what Oscar Lewis has termed the 'culture of poverty'.

To effect a change, there must be modernity which Lamond Tullis[1] defined as the 'process whereby men adjust themselves in terms of politics, society and culture so that they can develop their environment economically'. As this process unfolds, attitudes and values along with the physical and social environment must necessarily undergo change.

This change must, of necessity, affect the general standard of education in society. The erroneous notions about the concept of government and its processes on the part of some politicians has been due to a lack of adequate basic education. The state of "modernity" will ensure that politics does not throw up a Minister who cannot read and digest an Executive Council memorandum or the type who believes that government can never be short of money, since it can manufacture its own. It may be that until such a day arrives, the constitution of developing countries should lay down a minimum standard of education which a person should attain before he can be appointed a Minister of government. It is only when this "modernity" has been achieved that the relationship between the political boss and the administrator can assume the conventional form familiar to Western democracy – that of the Minister being master of policy, and the administrator, the instrument. Or can it be that public administration in developing countries will evolve a tradition all of its own, making the career administrator the master of policy and his Minister, its purveyor?

---

[1]F. Lamond Tullis: *Politics and Social Change in Third World Countries*. John Wiky & Sons Inc; 1973.

The Land Use Decree of 1978: If the Past should be Prologue . . . !

IFEBUEME OKPALA*

The Land Use Decree of 29th March, 1978,[1] in effect nationalised all land in Nigeria. The Decree stipulates that, from its commencement;

a all land in urban areas shall be under the control and management of the Military Governor of each State; and

b all other land shall, subject to this Decree, be under the control and management of the local government within the area of jurisdiction of which the land is situated.

The Decree has the expressed objective of:

i asserting and preserving by law, the rights of all Nigerians to the lands of Nigeria; and

ii assuring, protecting and preserving the rights of all Nigerians to use and enjoy land in Nigeria and the natural fruits thereof in sufficient quantity to enable them to provide for the sustenance of themselves and their families.

The Decree is revolutionary, only in its scope, for prior to it, some lands in Nigeria were already State Lands and Governments in Nigeria have long had the powers of compulsory acquisition of lands. These powers had been widely used by governments, though on *ad hoc* basis. The Land Use Decree has apparently removed this *ad hoc* character of compulsory acquisition and made compulsory acquisition a once and for all exercise.

As far as the expressed intentions of the Decree goes – which is that 'land shall be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians', – it is unassailable. Often times however, good intentions alone are not enough in matters such as this. Experience, being the best teacher, the history of what happened in the past would generally serve as a pointer to the shape of similar events in the future.

We have noted that there had been State lands in Nigeria long before this Decree,

---

*Dr Okpala is on the staff of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

[1] *'Federal Republic of Nigeria: Decree No 6 - Land Use Decree, 1978'. (Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary No 14 Vol 65 of 29th March, 1978).*

and that the Federal and State Governments in the country had possessed and had widely exercised powers of compulsory land acquisitions long before the Land Use Decree of 1978. The purpose of this paper is to argue that if the manner and patterns of beneficiary distribution incidence in State lands and State-managed or controlled lands in the past were to be a mirror for the pattern of beneficiary distribution under the new Land Use Decree, then the Decree would clearly achieve what it apparently set out to prevent or remedy. This contention will be illustrated with three examples from different parts of the country. Based on these and similar practical experiences in the administration of government-controlled lands in the past, it is argued that the real relevance of the Land Use Decree, does not lie in the Decree itself as such, but rather on the manner of implementation of the Decree and on the outcome of the exercise. The important and guiding question to the Decree's effectiveness and relevance should not therefore be 'what are the benefits of the Land Use Decree?', but rather, 'who are the beneficiaries?'.

Past Distribution Patterns of Publicly-Managed Lands

The following three examples of the pattern of beneficiary distribution in publicly-managed lands are drawn from the former Western Region, Lagos and the former East Central State respectively.

Example 1: The Former Western Region

The allocation of State (Crown) lands to individuals in this region started in late 1959, (Coker 1962: 21). Table 1 below shows the beneficiary distribution of about 99 acres of State lands allocated over the three years between 1959 and 1962. The approximately 99 acres of land at different locations in the region then were ostensibly allocated to 'the public'. For all these 99 acres, the beneficiary public consisted wholly and solely of only 48 Ministers of State and high Party and Government officials, and these lands were allocated to these beneficiaries at very nominal rents.

The breakdown of the distribution among these Ministers and officials, as indicated in Table I, shows that at least, three had four plots each; ten had three plots each, and twenty-two had two plots each, while only thirteen had one plot each. As it was, the then unwritten rule of 'one man, one plot' was honoured in only thirteen out of the 99 cases (in effect 13 per cent of the cases). One of the Ministers who had eight such plots, in a reply to the Coker Commission's[1] questions as to why he should not surrender some of those plots, so that other people could get one, stated that he could not give up any of the plots because he was making arrangements for 'the rainy day', and emphasized that,

> '. . . if I was pressed to leave my Crown land over and above the one to which I was entitled, then I would have had to resign because I have already got loans to improve the plots, and I could not afford to lose them.[2]

---

[1]Fed. Min. of Information, Lagos: *Report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Certain Statutory Corporations In Western Nigeria, 1962, Vol III Part IV: Western Housing Corporation.* See also the Verbatm Reports Day 24, p 60.

[2]*Ibid* (p 22-23).

The Commission very rightly advised that, 'As a Minister of State, he should realise the desirability of limiting the number of Crown lands acquired by him, if only to demonstrate to the people of the country that he was not taking over for himself, the lands which the government has made available to all the people of the country'.

This case reflects the degree of selflessness, fairness and responsibility with which public resources are administered, and suggests the degree of credibility and confidence which the ordinary citizen should repose on "public trustees" to translate the goals of public policy into reality.

Table 1

Beneficiary Distribution of State owned and managed urban lands in the Western Region, 1959-1962.

No of plots per Beneficiary	*No of Beneficiaries*	*Total No of Plots*
1	13	13
2	22	44
3	10	30
4 and over	3	12
Total	48 persons	99 acres

Note: Each plot was approximately one acre in size.

Source: Tabulated from the *Report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry Into the Affairs of Certain Statutory Corporations in Western Nigeria*, 1962, Vol IV Appendix 44, pp 92-93. This source also contains the names of the beneficiaries.

Example 2: The Former Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDE)

Until 1972, the Lagos Executive Development Board was the Town Planning Authority for Lagos, and it also controlled public lands allocation in the city. The pattern of beneficiary distribution of a sample of its allocations among the socio-economic groups in the society is reflected in Table 2.

The Table shows that the politicians, the lawyers, doctors and businessmen monopolised publicly allocated urban land resources. Although Table 2 is only a sample, it is representative of the general pattern of land allocation made by the agency. In most cases, these land were compulsorily acquired from their owners (many of whom might have been poor) on 'public purposes' rationale, and the new beneficiaries got these plots at nominal rents.

The pattern depicted in Table 2, raises the possibility that public control of lands could mean or result in the use of public instruments to assemble land for the elite, which given the traditional land tenure structure and problems, they would otherwise find difficult assembling for themselves.

Table 2

Beneficiary Distribution of LEDB Plots among Socio-Economic Groups.

Socio-Economic (Occupational) Group	*No of Beneficiaries*	*% of Total*
Politicians and Public Servants	50	28.6
Institutional/Commercial Firms	38	21.7
Businessmen – Traders		
Bankers and Traditional Chiefs	30	17.1
Legal (Lawyers and Judges)	21	12.0
Medical Doctors	12	6.9
LEDB Officials	10	5.7
University Academics	2	1.1
Classification Uncertain	12	6.9
	175	100.0

Source: Calculated from the *Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Lagos Executive Board*, 1967. Appendix VIII "Apapa Plots: Allocation between 1-10-60 to 31-12-65", (P.250); and Appendix III: "Rent Arrears in respect of Apapa Plots as at 31-12-66' (P.231).

Note: These classifications are only very approximate, for most of the time, these groups are not mutually exclusive. Most lawyers are politicians and most politicians belong to one other profession or occupational group or the other. In any case, the political class (including bureaucrats) make up over 70 per cent of the beneficiaries.

Perhaps, the observation of the Sagoe Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB), applied to a wider context, is very relevant to a fair and socially desirable implementation of the present Land Use Decree. The Commission observed that,

> LEDB plots of land, being of the very best title at present available in Lagos, care should be taken that these plots of land, the genuineness of which is guaranteed by the State, should not fall into the hands of financiers to the detriment of the common man. We take the view that a scheme of this sort should cater for and build houses to suit the pocket of the common man whose interest, we are sure, the State has in mind[1].

Hitherto in Nigeria, there had not been a landed and a landless class in the classical sense of the terms. The traditional land tenure system (despite the problems it posed for development), was in many ways an egalitarian one. Unless there is a definite change from the past pattern of beneficiary incidence in government controlled land resources, then the Land Use Decree is likely to succeed only in creating the classical landed and landless classes in the society.

[1]Fed. Republic of Nigeria: *Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Lagos Executive Development Board*, 1967.

Example 3: Government Plots Allocation in the Former East Central State 1970-1975

The former East Central State was successively served by three Commissioners for Lands and Housing, from 1970 to 1975. For purposes of this discussion, we shall refer to the regimes of these Commissioners as C_1, C_2, and C_3 in the order in which they served.

The Commissioner for Lands and Housing is statutorily responsible, among other things, for allocating Government or State lands to citizens. In this regard, there was a standing regulation in the then East Central State, that before land allocations could be made, there should be applications from the prospective allottees, and that this should be following public advertisements that plots would be allocated on State or Government lands[1]. In respect of these regulations, Table 3 shows the degree of compliance of the three successive Commissioners.

Table 3
Proportion of State Lands Allocated without advertisements

Regime	*Total plots allocated*	*No of plots allocated without advertisements*	*% of total (allocated without adverts)*
C1	371	6	1.6
C2	1524	807	53.0
C3	754	536	71.0

Source: Computed from, ECSG: White Paper on the Report of the Administrative Board of Inquiry into Plot Allocation, 1976 (p.4).

In the regime of the two later Commissioners, over 50% of the plots got allocated without advertisements. The implications of allocation without advertisements are of course obvious. As the Board of Inquiry found out, this resulted in the Commissioners:

a allocating large numbers of plots to themselves, their kith and kin, their friends and supporters; and this in turn led to;
b allocating plots to people who could not be said to have the means to develop them, and whose intentions were mainly to acquire plots for sale.

One of the Commissioners for example, allocated a total of 1,524 plots, and 40 (2.6%) of these were allocated to self or relations/kinsmen. The other (C3) allocated 754 plots and 15 (2.0%) of the total to himself. In these allocations too, there were 71 persons with more than two plots each.[2]

[1]East Central State Government: *White Paper on the Report of the Administrative Board of Inquiry into Plot Allocation* (p 4).
[2]*Ibid.* Appendix V, p 27-29.

The main features of the allocation of State lands during this period were, as characterised by the Government White Paper:

i the disproportionate and staggering number of plots allocated without advertisements.

It is pertinent to point out in this regard that the present Land Use Decree does not provide for advertisements before land allocations are made. The consequences of not providing for this might be detrimental to the achievement of the objectives of the scheme.

ii a large number of persons and groups of persons allocated two or more plots;

iii allocations made to students (including minors) who were hardly in a position to develop their plots;

iv a most unseemly and blatant display of nepotism in the allocation of plots on State Lands.

The sum total of the foregoing examples is to suggest that State lands and other publicly controlled and managed land resources essentially benefit and are in fact, monopolised by otherwise privileged groups and individuals – highly-placed public servants, politicians, the economically powerful and the relations and friends of these privileged groups. In fact, the list of beneficiaries of publicly allocated lands in the past had generally read like a political WHO'S WHO. The "public purpose" rationale on which these lands were acquired in the first place, were more often than not, personified on these privileged groups and individuals. These examples also serve to illustrate the degree of abuse of office and the perversion of stated public policy goals and objectives by those charged with the execution of such policies. These also underlie the substantial degree of scepticism with which the present Land Use Decree is viewed by many.

Summary and Conclusions

The foregoing examples have attempted to argue that public ownership and control of land as embodied in the Land Use Decree of 1978, does not necessarily (by itself) ensure the achievement of those objectives envisaged by the Decree. If anything, previous experiences show that the reverse can be the case. The realisation of the potentials of the measure would obviously depend more on the degree of fairness, integrity and equity involved in the administration or implementation of the Decree, rather than on the fact of the Decree as such. After all, most evils associated with private ownership and control are also inherent in public ownership and control. The State or 'Public', after all, is personified by the same fallible human beings (as in the foregoing examples), as in private ownership – human beings who conceivably could and do often times exercise public authority in such perverse manner that the resulting outcome do prove as undesirable as, or even worse than the outcome of private or communal land ownership system that public control seeks to remedy. Thus, the ideal expectations of public ownership and management objectives often get thwarted in the process of execution.

While these consequences are not inevitable, however, they nevertheless represent tendencies in the behaviour of people in public office, which should surely be a warning to those who advance the proposition or hope that public ownership

automatically implies land policies which are more productive and just than the traditional system of land ownership and control.[1] State power may not make men virtuous. Rather, it could put too much power into the hands of a few in a manner which towers above the petty powers of individual land owners,[2] and the State as a bad landlord admits of no peaceful alternative.

The Land Use Decree of 1978, therefore cannot be an end in itself. It will be judged and justified only in so far as it is implemented in favour of the common good, rather than to protect or advance the interests of the already privileged. A high degree of fairness, integrity and equity are required for a successful and socially desirable outcome of the Decree. The past pattern of beneficiary incidence of State and publicly controlled land allocation should not be prologue to the outcome of the new Land Use Decree.

---

[1]Okpala, D.C.I.: ('Accessibility Distribution aspects of public urban land management: A Nigerian Case'). (HABITAT, vol 4 No 1, 1978).

[2]Walters, A. A. *et al: Government and the Land.* (Institute of Economic Affairs, Reading 13, London 1974).

Urban Planning in Nigeria

HARRY A. GREEN*

Introduction

With the growing complexity of modern government and the thrust for development, particularly in Third and Fourth World countries, the growing complexity of modern organizations and the inter-relatedness of problems, a corollary development has been the advocacy of more comprehensive and integrated planning to ensure more effective control of the development process. This is true for all types of planning including national economic development planning and urban and regional planning. The very nature of these types of planning in the Third and Fourth World countries, intruding on every aspect of life, makes development planning one of the most complex of all human activities.[1]

What is Urban Planning?

Urban Planning can be very broad or very narrow, comprehensive in focus or specific in focus, systems oriented or problem-oriented. However, the essential features that distinguish urban planning from other types of planning is its concern for geographical space in the urban environment. According to Peter Hall, urban planning:[2]

> refers to planning with a spatial, or geographical component, in which the general objective is to provide for a spatial structure of activities (or of land uses) which in some way is better than the pattern existing without planning.

This view of urban planning is not without its critics. Indeed, Hall envisages human geography as the basic discipline of 'urban and regional planning' while others conceive of geographical space (or land use) as too limited a concept to provide even a proper comprehension of spatial planning. As George Chadwick has argued:[3]

---

*The author is presently a Consultant in Urban Management, Nashville, Tennessee, USA, Formerly, he was Professor of Public Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria and United Nations Consultant in Urban Management and Development in Nigeria.

[1]Albert Waterston, *Development Planning: Lessons in Experience.* Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965.

[2]Peter Hall, *Urban and Regional Planning.* Penguin Books, 1974, p 7.

[3]George Chadwick, *A Systems View of Planning: Towards a Theory of the Urban and Regional Planning Process.* Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1971, p 97.

The physical construction heritage of the planning profession has resulted in an overwhelming concentration upon 'containers', rather than upon the processes which involve and use such physically adopted spaces, and a reorientation towards a process view of planning is a fundamental necessity.

Chadwick does not argue against the importance of geographic space nor the need to influence and control land use. Rather, he would take a 'system view of planning' in which space is conceived in economic, social and geographic terms as well as the 'depiction of spatial structures as parts of meaningful systems of relationships' and interactions with people.[1]

The process conception of planning is an emerging paradigm and the 'systems view' helps provide the dynamic change dimension that older blueprint planning ignored.[2] Moreover, it provides a broader view of the relationship between the use of space and the consequences of using it in a particular fashion. *It raises the question of Why as well as How.* Thus, the very nature of the new paradigm forces a more comprehensive view of planning.[3]

Comprehensive plans are not operational. They can provide analyses of operations, their co-ordination and their consequences but they cannot provide the operational details for functional agencies because of the lack of expertise, resources, time and the phenomenon of unanticipated consequences. *Therefore, the only operational plans are the annual recurrent and capital budgets and the work plans of the agencies that perform urban functions.*[4] In Nigeria, this would include Federal, State and local agencies and the coordination of urban planning would involve the coordination of the work activities of these various agencies.

In most circumstances, this type of action-coordination is beyond the scope and power of urban planning authorities. However, the planning agency can direct itself towards the review of the consequences of the actions of operational agencies. This involves an elaborate effort to monitor the local urban system effectively and to improve greatly the collection and analysis of statistical data, the distribution of the results of such analyses, and the creation of new indicators of urban health or pathology. Economics is easily the most advanced of all the social sciences and the primary reason for that is because of the development of elaborate data sources and economic indicators. Urban planners and administrators need indicators for the urban system, and eventually a composite urban welfare index.

To be more successful, comprehensive planning must achieve two radical changes. First, it must avoid the tendency to over-simplify the urban system and to assume

---

[1] *Ibid.* pp 100, 104.

[2] Ervin Laszlo has noted that 'the systems view is the emerging contemporary view of organized complexity'. *The Systems View of the World.* New York: George Braziller, 1972, p 15.

[3] Comprehensive is used synonomously with 'holistic' that is, looking at the urban world in terms of sets of integrated relations.

[4] Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, *Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries.* New York: John Wiley, 1974. Chapters 9 and 10.

that a comprehensive plan can coordinate administrative actions in the urban arena. A related matter concerns the tendency towards centralized control. The failure of comprehensive plans to achieve effective coordination should not be considered a manifestation of too much diversity but rather as an indication that basic planning precepts are erroneous. The tendency to believe in the efficacy of the concentration of authority at the top of the hierarchy and the narrowing of authority at the base of the hierarchy must be recognized for the authoritarian concept that it becomes in practice.

Urban Planning in Nigeria: A Macroanalytical View

The past neglect of urban planning in Nigeria can be highlighted by a statement from the *Third National Development Plan:* 'One of the main weaknesses of Nigeria's planning efforts hitherto has been its heavy emphasis on sectoral and financial planning almost to the total neglect of physical planning'. Further, 'It is therefore the main objective of policy during this plan period to reverse this trend by paying greater attention to regional development, including physical and environmental planning, in order to enhance the quality of life for all citizens as development progresses'.[1]

As this indicates, urban policy is considered to be an important part of 'Regional Development Policy' and has six major aspects:

1 the creation of a Federal Ministry to 'initiate and coordinate policy';
2 a more direct responsibility of State Governments for the management of major urban centres;
3 correcting the inadequacy of physical planning;
4 providing the required urban infrastructure: roads, water, sanitation, housing;
5 to improve urban management through local government reform;
6 to pursue an integrated urban-rural development strategy.

As a part of its new commitment, the Federal Government established in 1975 a new Ministry of Housing, Urban Development and Housing (FMHUDE) to coordinate urban policy. To this end, the Federal Housing Authority and the Nigerian Building Society (now Federal Mortgage Bank) were transferred to the new Ministry. At present, however, it is still not clear to what extent these two institutions will continue to retain some autonomous characteristics and to what extent they will be integrated into the Ministry.

It would seem that FMHUDE has four major responsibilities:

1 the coordination of urban policy;
2 the promotion of housing development for all income groups, particularly low-income groups;
3 the protection of the environment, and
4 the integration of national and regional development, or economic planning with physical planning.

---

[1]Federal Republic of Nigeria. *Third National Development Plan*, 1975-80. Lagos, p 291.

All of these responsibilities are to a large extent interdependent. However, they are not explicit enough and need to be defined more precisely. The Third Plan, under the heading of 'Urban Policy' indicated that 'serious effort will be made to deal with the problems already created by the inadequacy of physical planning and urban infrastructure such as roads, housing, water supply, waste disposal and other social and communal facilities in the face of continuing rapid population growth and physical expansion'.[1] An analysis of this statement does not define organizational responsibilities.

The responsibility of FMHUDE to "initiate and coordinate urban policy" is organizationally complex and ambiguous.[2] If FMHUDE is to coordinate activities that relate to housing, urban planning and development, and environment, it inevitably means involvement in and some authority over these activities. Yet, it is doubtful whether at the moment, FMHUDE can even coordinate the activities of two of its constituent units: the Federal Housing Authority and the Federal Mortgage Bank

Secondly, since Nigeria is a Federal government, FMHUDE must be concerned about coordination on three levels: at the national level, at the regional or state level, and at the urban community level. While everyone recognizes this as a feature of federalism, seldom, if ever, is the complexity of such coordination fully understood. Imagine for example, the process of planning and scheduling all Federal programme inputs into each urban centre, through the process of coordination, so that each input is compatible with all state and local inputs and private investments, all oriented toward the maximum achievement of development goals both in the urban community and the nation as a whole.

Chapter 25 of the *Third Plan* is devoted to 'Town and Country Planning'. It is an interesting observation that this expression is preferred over 'urban and regional planning' but nothing in the Plan indicates the reason for the preference. In this Chapter, the Federal Government acknowledges the poor physical lay-out of cities and states that:[3]

> No single Nigerian town or village can be regarded as a model of good planning. Although new areas of expansion are beginning to exhibit some semblance of planning, the typical town or city in the country still consists largely of old residential areas which have simply 'grown' on their own with little attempt at any systematic lay-out.

Thus, the physical planning policy of this plan is to intensify physical planning of the major urban centres, to undertake urban renewal schemes, and to develop new settlement areas. Furthermore, as previously noted, efforts 'to achieve more efficient management of our urban centres will be initiated' through expanding the role of State Governments and reforming local governments. We will return to this subsequently.

---

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] For a detailed analysis of this, see Harry A. Green, 'Urban Management in Nigeria: A Systems and Organizational Approach', *Quarterly Journal of Administration* Vol X·4, (July, 1976).

[3] *Third Plan*, p 313.

To undertake this programme, a total sum of N754.8* million is allocated for all the states and for all categories of expenditures. As Table I indicates, the largest single category of expenditures is for urban roads (N236.3 million) with responsibility divided evenly between the Federal Government and the State Governments. Overall responsibility for the expenditures in 'Town and Country Planning' is predominantly that of the State Governments. Thus, it is estimated that N504.4 million (66.8%) of the total will be spent by State Governments while the Federal Government will spend directly around N250.3 million or 33.2%. Forty-seven percent of the Federal expenditure is allocated to urban roads.

Table 1
Town and Country Planning
1975-80
(N millions)

Government	*Urban Planning Urban Renewal, other Urban Development*	*Urban Roads*	*Total*
State	386.2	118.2	504.4 (66.8%)
Federal	132.4	118.1	250.5 (33.2%)
Total	518.6 (69%)	236.3 (31%)	754.9

Source: *Third National Development Plan*

The major responsibility of the State Governments is outlined as follows:[1]
The preparation of masterplans and regional plans, topographical and township maps, lay-out in respect of residential and commercial areas, the construction and reconstruction of urban roads and drainage, including parking facilities, street lighting, the purchase of refuse disposal equipment and the provision of public conveniences.

As in the case of the role of FMHUDE, this statement does not define organizational responsibilities, or examine the problem of coordinating urban projects and activities. The preparation of plans is obviously a job for planning agencies while urban roads, drainage, parking, street lighting and refuse disposal are operational activities that involve both State and Local governments. If these projects and activities are to proceed simultaneously, and that is the obvious conclusion, then urban planning cannot guide an important phase of urban physical development, much less coordinate the activities. Moreover, this section of the plan does not establish a clear policy concerning the balance between urban renewal of old areas 'to achieve greater functional efficiency and scenic beauty' and the lay-out of entirely new areas.

**The current value of the Nigerian Naira is* 1.242224=£1, Ed.
[1] *Ibid*, p 314.

Of the money available for 'Town and Country Planning' by the States, nearly 77% (N386.2 million) is for urban planning, urban renewal and new urban development projects. An examination of the 'Summary of State Programmes' reveals the following:

1 all summaries are incomplete in respect to total anticipated expenditures;
2 only 3 States list urban renewal projects (total N28 million);
3 urban planning is mentioned only in respect to masterplan implementation (State) and lay-outs for commercial and residential purposes; and
4 urban roads are the predominant concern of all States.

Urban Planning: A Microanalytical View

By and large, "town planning" has been a State (formerly Region) activity rather than a local government function. In Oyo State in the west, the function is performed by the Town Planning Division of the Ministry of Lands and Housing which supervises a number of "town planning" authorities, mostly located in former divisional headquarters. In Lagos State, all responsibility for town planning (formerly lodged with the Lagos Executive Development Board, the Ikeja Town Planning Authority and the Epe Town Planning Authority) is now centralized in the Ministry of Works and Planning. In Bendel State, the Bendel Development and Planning Authority has overall state responsibility for planning, housing and new urban development projects and operates area planning offices in the major cities. In Kano State, with its primate urban system, an independent State-created Metropolitan Kano Planning and Development Board was, until recently responsible for urban planning in Kano City. A similar pattern exists in Kaduna State for the city of Kaduna and in Plateau State for Jos. Bornu State recently created an Urban Development Board to guide urban development in the State. Similar examples can be found in Rivers, Cross-Rivers, Bauchi and Sokoto States.

While the foregoing may suggest a great deal of urban planning activity, it should be recognized that the fundamental criticism found in the Third Plan is still valid. The creation of institutional foci is only a beginning and must not be interpreted as a great achievement *per se*. As the experience in the former Western Region and State, in the Lagos Executive Development Board and the Metropolitan Kano Planning and Development Board indicates, professional planners are scarce, urban planning and development frequently has been perceived as a hostile intrusion into local affairs, planning activities have been limited to a narrow view of development control (and that frequently ineffective) and little or no progress has been made toward the development of the *organizational interdependencies* necesary to achieve coordinated urban/operational planning.[1]

[1]For one view of this, see S. O. Tokun, 'The Problems of Urban Planning in Developing Countries: A Case for Ibadan'. Ministry of Lands and Housing, Western State, February, 1973. For other problems of urban planning in Nigeria, see E. O. Adeniyi, 'The Management of Urban and Regional Planning' and T. A. Gihring, 'From Elitism to Accountability: Towards a Reformation of Nigerian Town Planning Law'; both in *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol X, 4 (July, 1976), and Leslie Green and Vincent Milone, 'Urbanization in Nigeria: A Planning Commentary', in Harry A. Green (ed). *The Management of Urban Development in Nigeria*. Ife: Faculty of Administration, 1976 (mimeo).

In furtherance of the Urban Policy statements of the Third Plan, comprehensive local government reforms have been carried out in Nigeria. The Third Plan proposed the adoption of the 'city management system' but this was abandoned in favour of a modified portfolio councillor/secretary system that is more or less uniform throughout the country. These reforms may have an important bearing on the future of urban planning in Nigeria.

The Guidelines for Local Government Reforms indicate that the reforms were essentially motivated by the need to stabilize and rationalize government at the local level. As the Nigerian Chief-of-Staff, Brigadier Yar Adua wrote in the 'Foreword':

> This must, of necessity, entail decentralization of some significant functions of State Governments to local levels in order to harness local resources for rapid development. The Federal Military Government has therefore decided to recognize Local Governments as the third tier of governmental activity in the nation.

In pursuit of this decision, the *Guidelines* include a Table indicating which functions should be devolved to local governments. This Table is divided into 2 parts which one might call the exclusive list and concurrent list of local government functions. In the case of the concurrent list, 'State Governments and other organizations may also perform part or whole of these functions if Local Governments are not equipped to perform them initially'. This suggests a temporariness in the performance of these functions which may not be justified in view of some of the functions included: for example, town and country planning, piped sewerage systems, public housing, water and atmospheric control, extensive social welfare activities and preventive health care. Moreover, if the continual performance of some of these functions by State and other organizations is temporary, no time schedule was suggested by which non-local governmental activity would be phased out.

Furthermore, it should be noted that a number of other important functions that greatly affect urban planning – communications, urban water supply, curative health services, urban roads, police, and secondary and university education activities – are the responsibilities of both Federal and State Governments and virtually all of them have a major urban significance. A fundamental question arises concerning whether or not local governments will be able, through the instrument of "town and country planning" to coordinate these activities and guide them toward desirable local government development objectives. How, for example, will the Oshogbo, Onitsha or Argungu local governments be able to influence NEPA* to conform to their local land use and development objectives (especially, if they conflict with NEPA's operational objectives)?

It is also interesting to note that the Guidelines indicated that 'there may be a need for statutory Planning and Development Authorities in major cities' (p 5).

---

*National Electric Power Authority.

Although this is a tentative statement, subsequent clarification indicates that such extant authorities would continue to exist and 'more . . . may be needed in future'. The existence of such bodies is justified when the city is important to an area for outside the confines of its Local Government – affecting may be the whole State (p 15). It is clear, therefore, that these would not be local government agencies but rather continue to be special bodies created by the States.

By and large, this must be interpreted as the desire to maintain a major State Government control over the development of capital cities. To date, no such bodies have been established in any cities other than State Capitals and one could argue that they are least needed there because of the greater resources of the local governments located there. One could argue also that the smaller cities are in greater need of such bodies because of fewer resources and lack of experience in planning and development.

As this analysis indicates, urban planning and management transcends local government administration, more clearly in the State Capitals, but in all cities because of the major, continuing role of Federal and State agencies in local development (eg electricity, curative health services, postprimary education). This inevitably creates greater complexity in programme planning and the ability to create appropriate mechanisms for coordination constitutes a major challenge for urban management.

An approach to this problem is suggested in the *Guidelines*. First, where these Boards exist there should be 'cross-membership' between the Board and the Local Government Council. Secondly, the responsibility for supervising both Local Governments and Planning and Development Boards will be located in the Ministry of Local Government in each State. An important issue not addressed, however, is whether "town and country planning" is to be conducted solely by the boards or whether it will be a concurrent responsibility. It would be a peculiar irony if this function is conducted exclusively by the Boards, or if dominated by the Boards, within the local government areas (State Capitals) ostensibly most capable of conducting the activity.

The traditional problems of local government (structure, personnel, finance) will not be significantly mitigated in the short-run, perhaps not even in a decade. Therefore, not many local governments will be able effectively to take over some very important functions in the 'concurrent test'. Many local governments will have trouble with town and country planning, public housing, piped sewerage systems, environmental pollution control, and perhaps others. The known shortages of professional urban planners and the rising demand for their services will surely make it difficult to effect an efficient land-use pattern in the 300 towns and cities of the local government system and to achieve an integrated planning framework.

Can Planning be Integrated?

Given the policy focus of the Third Plan much can be done about developing urban plans: masterplans, commercial and residential lay-outs and the like. One way to

achieve this is to follow the pattern of the past-hire planning consultants to develop the plans. This has been done in Kano, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Port Harcourt and special urban studies were conducted on 20 major urban centres by one of the world's leading planning consultant firms. There is little reason to believe, however, that such plans can be effective unless operational agencies are involved in the development of the plan and unless a *planning process* is created. Moreover, plans developed in this way are basically technical planning exercises divorced from the formal policy-making institutions and from the wider needs for citizen/group participation. Therefore, the vital question emerges about the value of masterplans *per se* until they are the expression of the formal policy making process. It is possible that this is the concept contained in the urban policy statements of the *Third Plan:* that is, coordination will not be a major problem because masterplans, as public policy, will coordinate urban activities at the local level.

The ideal masterplan is one that is both comprehensive and internally consistent. To the extent that comprehensive means a complete, thorough review of all alternative approaches to achieving development goals, an indication of the desirable future, and, a methodology to achieve it (through the control of undesirable intrusions), it becomes a limited possibility under the best of circumstances. Moreover, the requirement of consistency is equally elusive. As Albert Waterston has noted:[1]

> I have examined a great many national plans and many of the masterplans of urban communities, and I would say that on the whole only 5 per cent of those plans are internally consistent, and that is a very high estimate. However, even when a reasonable level of internal consistency is achieved, the results are frequently of little practical value because they give us only partial answers to planning problems.

The conventional belief that masterplans or urban planning can integrate planning activities that affect urban areas and coordinate urban programmes, projects and activities must now be modified. Urban planning, in the technical sense, must be recognized as the useful but limited tool that it is; only one weapon in the arsenal for the war against urban pathology. To the extent that we recognize the limitation of urban planning, we improve the prospect of its efficacy. The integration of planning requires more than an urban plan and an urban planning agency.[2] However, as will be suggested below, the planning agency can play a major role in the achievement of the level of coordination and integration required.

It must be clearly comprehended that the performance base of modern development efforts, at whatever level, is the large-scale, formal organization. Each organization with a development role belongs to an organizational system (Federal, State, local) that conditions and controls how an organization will perform. The operations realm for many such organizations may include both urban and rural areas and

---

[1] Weitz, *op cit*, p 193.

[2] See Harvey S. Perloff, 'Common Goals and the Linking of Physical and Social Planning', in B. J. Frieden and R. Morris (eds), *Urban Planning and Social Policy*. New York: Basic Books, 1968, pp 346-359. Also, E. M. Kaitz and Herbert Hyman, *Urban Planning and Social Welfare: A Model Cities Approach*. New York: Praeger, 1970.

coincide with the operations of other agencies of the same or different organizational system. Research into this area of inter-organizational relationships reveals that frequent conflicts develop between the organizational system (Federal) and the operations realm (the urban system).[1] It is in this context that integrated planning and programme coordination become most important.

Planning can be effectively integrated only if it is closely linked with implementation. This means not only linking the planning agencies more closely together but also linking planning to programme operations. As indicated above, this is organizationally complex and many inevitable conflicts will emerge. There are several pre-conditions for the more effective integration of planning on the one hand and planning and implementation on the other. In the first place, there is the need to concentrate on improving the understanding, receptiveness, and capacity for planning in all public organizations. The recommendations of the Public Service Review Commission should be resurrected and re-emphasized.[2] Until the basic performance unit of government becomes more effective, grand schemes for sophisticated integrated development activities is little more than a pleasant, unrealistic daydream. For example, the very exercise of public organizations learning to manage (or plan) by objectives or to budget by objectives increases the awareness of unnecessary organizational limitations. Moreover, it helps improve attitudes toward more effective planning by showing results and reducing fears of dire (perhaps personal) consequences.

Secondly, there needs to be an elaborate scheme for collecting and sharing planning data and knowledge about planning activities. No one will suggest that this is easy because if it was it would have been done already. Without it, however, the knowledge base of planning is weaker than it need be and suspicion among planning units at different levels is greater than it need be.

Thirdly, there is the need to develop appropriate organizational interdependencies to enhance both urban planning (at all levels) and urban action. The tendency of bureaucracy to organize around functions while inherently rational, has tended to create programmes of limited comprehension and limited impact. Human needs are rarely viewed within the context of an integrated strategy. Thus, housing for low-income citizens may be located in one part of the city while health services are located in another, while transport costs are high and traffic congestion ensures a day's round-trip journey.

In other writings, I have made specific recommendations concerning a special approach to organizational interdependence which I call *urban polyarchy*. Fundamentally, this involves the development of a network of relevant policy and programme relationships manifested in formal *ad hoc* organizations, task teams,

[1]Green, 'Urban Management in Nigeria', *loc cit.*

[2]For a perspective of the containment of administrative reform, see W. G. Odiase, 'Administrative Power and Departmental Effectiveness', *The Bureaucrat*, Vol 4.3 (July/September, 1976), pp 8-10.

or policy planning teams to undertake important activities that normal bureaucratic approaches are too inflexible to pursue. The essential difference between polyarchic organizations and inter-ministerial or inter-departmental committees is that they should be designed to define and solve problems.

One polyarchic approach at the Federal level would be the creation of a *national urban council*. Such a council should be composed of representatives of all major Federal agencies that have a significant urban impact. FMHUDE should play a major role in the construction of the agenda for meetings and for providing the analyses necessary to promote decisions about programme planning, linkages and evaluation. A similar council or board could be created in each State.

In my consideration of urban problems of Kano, a polyarchic approach was proposed. I recommended the creation of a Metropolitan Action Council (MAC), the purpose of which is threefold. First, MAC would be responsible for intervening in normal administrative processes when action is thwarted. The formal authority to do this may be limited but in the case of critical problems, 'moral suasion' could be an effective approach. Secondly, MAC would provide the 'crisis management' capacity at the local level to respond to emergencies, unanticipated problems or special problems which have no organizational focus. Thirdly, the MAC would develop an annual urban budget – a compilation of the proposed activities of all major agencies (Federal, State and local) by programmes, projects and proposed expenditures. Such data would provide a basis for the sharing of planning data and the annual budget would then become the basic planning document.

The membership of the MAC would be drawn from all the major urban institutions in the area and others could be co-opted as needed. Thus, officials of Federal, State and local agencies would be members and the urban planning agency would become the staff arm of MAC.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to provide an overview of some of the contemporary issues affecting urban planning in Nigeria. In view of the urban policy initiatives of the Third Plan, it is significant that FMHUDE, was not even mentioned in the *Guidelines for Local Government Reform*. One of the most lamented issues in the literature about urbanization in the developing countries, is the continued failure of countries to adopt a national urban policy structure and to create a special Ministry to conduct urban affairs. It is ironic that Nigeria has done both, but yet has not pressed the initiative in relationship to coordination at the top for implementation below. While it is true that FMHUDE is not concerned with local government *per se*, its *raison d'etre* is to be concerned with approximately 300 cities that constitute the urban system on the one hand and local government headquarters cities on the other.

A fundamental issue of contemporary importance is the continuing, over-zealous faith in comprehensive planning. In a non-institutional setting the theoretical opposite of comprehensiveness would be *laissez-faire*. From an institutional

perspective however, the opposite is much more likely to be "disjointed incrementalism".[1] One involves total planning while the other is intendedly limited. Both of these views, however, flounder on the shoals of modern complexity. *Human society is too complex to be planned and managed by disjointed increments of public policy and too complex to pretend that comprehensiveness means completeness or totality.*

The fundamental failure of contemporary urban planning is that it has set for itself the impossible goal of comprehensive assessment for determining the best public policy. Comprehensiveness is a desirable planning objective not a reality. As long as intelligent human beings know that it is permanently elusive, planners who cling tenaciously to comprehensiveness as reality will never be taken seriously by either policy-makers or citizens.

As a substitute, I have suggested a holistic view of planning similar to the systems approach, but with greater emphasis on guidance than control. Moreover, efforts toward integrating planning will improve the capacity for indicative (or guidance) planning. To focus on this problem I have suggested the acceptance of the annual budget as the basic planning document, the forging of more effective linkages between planning and operational agencies, and the development of *urban polyarchy* as an approach to achieving effective, interorganizational planning/action linkages.

The problems of planning are reflective of the problems of society. One can hardly expect them to be solved – only changed and ameliorated.

---

[1]Charles E. Lindblom and D. Braybrooke, *A Strategy of Decision-Making*. New York: Free Press, 1965.

The Count-Down to Civil Rule in Nigeria: The Constituent Assembly

A. AKINSANYA*

On October 1st, 1975, the late Head of the Federal Military Government (FMG), General Murtala Ramat Muhammed announced, in a nation-wide radio/television broadcast, a five-stage programme of delimitarisation and civilianisation:

i The drafting of a Constitution and the creation of any new states;

ii Newly-created states were to be given time to settle down; the local government set-up was to be reorganised, followed by elections; elections to be held for a Constituent Assembly.

iii Lifting of the ban on political activities and the formation of political parties.

iv/v Elections to Federal/State legislatures and a return to civil rule on October 1st, 1979.

According to this five-stage programme, we are now at the end of the second phase. The forty-nine member Constitutional Drafting Committee, otherwise known as the forty-nine 'wise men', had prepared a draft constitution after a careful and painstaking consideration of the reports of its seven sub-committees; new states had been created and are now 'settling' down while the local government set-up had been reorganised, with what success remains to be seen.

As we noted above, Nigerians are now coming to the final phase of Stage II, namely, the election to the Constituent Assembly. But how are the members of the Constituent Assembly to be elected or selected? And, what is a Constituent Assembly and its function? Briefly stated, a Constituent Assembly is expected, in the words of the late Head of State, 'to consider and accept the draft constitution' which has generated much controversy among Nigerians from all walks of life. The draft constitution has evoked much controversy because this is the first time in Nigeria's political history that constitutional proposals have been thrown open for discussion at all levels of society and also because there are a number of major departures from previous constitutions, for example, the provision for the office of an Executive President.

---

*Dr Akinsanya is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Lagos. This Article was written in September 1977.

Since the Constituent Assembly is not only going to be a forum for political aspirants but also a forum for a thorough and painstaking discussion of the draft constitution, then it is obvious that its members must not only be informed and articulate but also that the assembly must be truly representative of the people. Therefore, in the words of Chief Awolowo, a constituent 'assembly should consist of representatives of various interests, including political parties, trade unions, farmers' organizations, trading concerns etc.' Indeed, 'its inherent and inseparable attribute is that it must be composed of representatives duly elected by the registered voters in the country. This we must have. Anything other than this, we submit, cannot in strict constitutional sense and usage, be a constituent assembly. And it would be a grand deception to give it that name'.

The Constituent Assembly, expected to consider and accept the draft constitution would have 203 elected members:

Kano	16 = 16
Oyo	15 = 15
Sokoto	14 = 14
Imo and Kaduna each	13 = 26
Cross River	12 = 12
Anambra and Borno each	11 = 22
Bauchi, Bendel, Benue, Gongola and Ondo each	10 = 50
Plateau	9 = 9
Kwara, Lagos, Ogun and Rivers each	8 = 32
Niger	7 = 7
	203

In addition, seven members of the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC), namely, the Chairmen and Chairman of its sub-committees, would go to the Assembly to allow for continuity. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Assembly are to be nominated by the Supreme Military Council (SMC), while twelve Nigerians are to be nominated by the SMC. All told, the Constituent Assembly would consist of about 224 members.

But what are the qualifications for membership of the Constituent Assembly. First, all prospective candidates for election to the Assembly must be Nigerian citizens. Second, they must be eighteen years old and above. Third, they must not be subject to any legal incapacity. Finally, they must pay a non-refundable registration fee of N50.00 to the Electoral Commission.

How are members to be elected? Contrary to peoples' expectations, local councils are to be used as electoral colleges for constituting the Constituent Assembly. In effect, only Councillors can vote in the elections to the Assembly. Assuming we accept the government logic of using the local councils as electoral colleges, the regulation that 'Councillors can vote but cannot nominate and that those who can

nominate cannot vote', is surely a negation of democracy. Additionally, the decision to use local councils as electoral colleges is obviously not in consonance with the view of the late Head of State, who, in inaugurating the CDC on October 18th, 1975, declared that 'all areas of interest which ought to partake in the process of Constitution-making shall have adequate opportunity as participants in the Constituent Assembly'.

Many Nigerians from all walks of life have condemned the use of local councils as electoral colleges for constituting the Constituent Assembly not only because a large group of articulate and well-informed Nigerians, namely, civil servants and teachers of all categories, will be barred from running for elections to the Assembly but also because the Assembly, as it is to be composed, could not be said to be a true reflection of the composition of the Nigerian Society. As one Nigerian newspaper rightly observed: 'Let the Constituent Assembly reflect the true composition of the Nigerian society. Let it comprise deputies of businessmen, farmers, workers, bureaucrats, soldiers, professionals, teachers and students. The only way to achieve this is by free and fair direct elections into the Constituent Assembly'. One more fundamental objection to the use of local councils as electoral colleges for constituting the Constituent Assembly is that the councils have not had enough time to establish public confidence, more so when elections at the local government level were conducted on individual merit without partisan politics. Therefore, to have a Constituent Assembly that would truly reflect the composition of the Nigerian society, there have been suggestions by Nigerians from all walks of life that the Federal Military Government should nominate delegates to represent such associations and interest groups as the Nigerian Union of Teachers, Nigerian Union of Journalists, National Association of University Teachers, Nigerian Bar Association, Nigerian Medical Association, Nigerian Political Science Association, National Union of Nigerian Students, Market Women Association, Trade Unions, Farmers' Union, Nigerian Civil Service Union, Nigerian Women Society and the Armed Forces. In effect, a Constituent Assembly so constituted will be in consonance with the declared view of the late Head of State already quoted.

We believe that the Assembly will do more than just consider and accept the draft constitution. Indeed, the Assembly could reject the draft constitution or modify some of its provisions having regard to the views espoused by the generality of the Nigerian people. Indeed, since the draft constitution contains a number of provisions that are major departures from previous constitutions, the Constituent Assembly should do more.

In any case, when members of the Constituent Assembly convene to 'consider' the draft constitution, they will have before them not only the draft constitution but also the two reports prepared by a Task Force appointed by the FMG to collate public reactions to the draft constitution as well as reports on symposia, workshops and conferences organised by various associations and institutions on the draft constitution. Reading through the Report of the CDC containing the draft constitution, one is left without any doubt that discussions in the Constituent Assembly will centre on the following issues:

1 the relationship between the President and the National Assembly
2 the role and working of the Presidential Commissions
3 the role and working of the various Standing Committees of the National Assembly
4 the relationship between the President and individual citizen
5 the role of the judiciary in the event of conflicts arising from 1-4 above
6 the role of the press.

Perhaps one issue that has generated much discussion and controversy among Nigerians in respect of the draft constitution is the freedom of the press. Those who make a passionate case for freedom of the press maintain, first, that discussion on the Press by members of the CDC was kept secret; second, that a majority of the members suppressed the views of the minority during the CDC debate on the press; and third, that because there were those with 'skeletons' in their cupboards which they did not want revealed, it is little wonder that the CDC was pervaded by an anti-press feeling.

Let us now examine the place of the press in the draft constitution. In the first place, the freedom of the press is subsumed as part of the right of the Nigerian citizen to freedom of expression. Section 32(1) of the draft constitution provides thus:

> Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.

And, Section 32(2) emphasises thus:

> Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, every person shall be entitled to own, establish and operate any medium for the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions.

But this subsection was qualified by a proviso 'that no person other than the Government of the Federation or a State or any other person or body authorised by the President shall own, establish or operate a television or wireless broadcasting station for any purpose whatsoever'. The question may be asked: if the Federal and State Governments have sole control of television and radio, and the Federal Government has taken over control of two widely-circulated newspapers, with its State counterparts also controlling some newspapers established with public funds, can one, strictly speaking, contend that there are enough provisions in the draft constitution guaranteeing the freedom of the press? The answer is probably 'yes' and 'no'. 'Yes' in the sense that the right to own agencies of the mass media is guaranteed by Section 32(2) of the draft constitution, and 'No' in the sense it is only the well-to-do that can exercise these rights. This is not to argue that Section 32(2) of the draft constitution should be deleted since the problem can be resolved by the State not the Federal Government having control and ownership of the mass media.

Although we have argued that there are inadequate provisions relating to the

freedom of the press in the draft constitution, it is interesting to know that the draft constitution expects some obligations from the press. Section 16 of the draft constitution is very blunt:

> The press, Radio, Television and other agencies of the mass media shall at all times be free to uphold the Fundamental Objectives contained in this Chapter of this Constitution and uphold the responsibility and accountability of the government to the people.

In effect, the press is charged with two specific tasks: to uphold the Fundamental Objectives contained in Chapter II of the draft constitution and to ensure that the government is responsible and accountable to the people. And one would have thought that the only way to carry out these specific duties is through accurate and in-depth reporting as well as constructive criticisms of public functionaries.

It would appear therefore that the members of the CDC are clear about the tasks of the press. What they have failed to realise is that the Press would need much more than rights to freedom of expression and opinion in order to discharge those obligations required of them under the draft constitution. A more fundamental reason for demanding enhanced provisions for the press is that the CDC has recommended an Executive Presidency for post-1979 Nigeria, more so when the Federal Government has virtually taken control of the mass media with the federalisation of the television industry and the take-over of two newspapers already mentioned; second, when the cost of running a newspaper industry has become so prohibitive, thus making it a virtual monopoly of the very wealthy; and third, when government functionaries have tended to see criticism of the government and attacks on the government as being synonymous with treason. In effect, a free, courageous and enlightened press is probably more important than the judiciary in protecting the rights and the freedom of individuals. This is because even a fearless judiciary, the custodian of the constitution, owes much to a bold, courageous and effective press. A good example is the role played by the American press in unveiling the Watergate scandal, a scandal which not only destroyed the political careers of leading American figures including President Nixon but also created a crisis of confidence in the American system of government. It would, therefore, in the author's view be better were Section 32, relating to the right of freedom of expression and the press, revised so as to read as follows:

> Section 32-(1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, every person shall be entitled to own, establish and operate any medium for the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions: Provided that only the State rather than the Government of the Federation or a State shall own, establish or operate a television or wireless broadcasting station for any purpose whatsoever.

Since we have argued earlier that only the propertied-class can exercise the rights to the freedom of the press, then it is only fair to say that the State rather than the Government should take over total ownership of the newspaper industry. We are recommending a State ownership of the newspaper industry because we believe that whereas a government-controlled newspaper is the megaphone of its owners, after

all he who pays the piper calls the tune, a State-owned newspaper would not only be the mouthpiece of the nation, it would also reflect the views of the nation as a whole.

Having argued for a State ownership of the newspaper industry, a question may be asked, namely: Who controls the members of the press? This question is very fundamental, first, because it has been alleged that a majority of Nigerian journalists are poorly educated; second, some journalists have been accused by government functionaries, among other Nigerians, of suppressing some vital information of public interest because of material interests or gross professional incompetence or the undue influence of certain important or powerful Nigerians.

Because of the obligations required of the press as contained in Section 16 of the draft constitution, it is imperative that there should be a code of conduct for journalists similar to the code of conduct for public officers provided in the Fourth Schedule of the draft constitution. First, journalism like law or medicine would have to be treated as a profession, with only duly qualified persons with the requisite qualifications as determined by the profession *per se* allowed to practise journalism in the country. Thus, it is not enough to have a university degree in mass communication in order to be a journalist just as it is not enough to have a law degree to practise in a Nigerian court. Like the holders of law degrees who *must* pass the prescribed examinations set by the Nigerian Law School to practise, Nigerians who wish to make journalism a profession *must* pass the prescribed examinations set by, say, the Nigerian Centre for Journalism itself responsible to the National Assembly. Additionally, in order to ensure religious adherence to Section 16 of the draft constitution, there should be created a Nigerian Press Council vested with similar powers to investigate cases of misconduct against any of their members and impose appropriate penalties. The creation of the Nigerian Centre for Journalism and the Nigerian Press Council would, in effect, mean an additional provision relating to the right to freedom of expression and the press. Section 32(3) would read thus:

> There shall be a Nigerian Centre for Journalism and a Nigerian Press Council responsible to the National Assembly.

Since we have made a case for State ownership of the Radio, Television and the Press, then there should be created a Mass Communication Commission responsible to the National Assembly – as an addition to the list of Commissions mentioned in the draft constitution.

One other issue which has direct bearing on the issues noted above, and is certain to generate much-heated controversy in the Constituent Assembly is the justiciability or otherwise of the fundamental objectives and the directive principles of State Policy enshrined in Chapter II of the draft constitution. Section 9(1) is very explicit:

> The motto of the Republic shall be UNITY AND FAITH, PEACE AND PROGRESS and accordingly national integration shall be actively encouraged whilst discrimination

on the grounds of place of origin, religion, sex, status, ethnic, linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited.

Section 9(2) is even more explicit:

For the purpose of promoting national integration it shall be the duty of the State to -
a provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the country;
b secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the country;
c encourage intermarriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious or other sectional barriers;
d promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious or other sectional barriers.

To this end, Sections 10(3), 11(3) and 12(1, 2 and 4) are very pertinent. Section 10(3) provides, *inter alia:*

The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring -
a the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development;
b that the material resources of the community are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common good;
c that the economic system is not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or the means of production and exchange in the hands of a few individuals or a group; and
d suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, minimum living wage, old age care and pensions, and unemployment benefits, for all Nigerian citizens.

Section 11(3) equally provides that:

The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring -
a that all citizens, without discrimination on any grounds whatsoever have the opportunity for securing adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate opportunities to secure suitable employment;
b that provision is made for public assistance in deserving cases or other conditions of need;
c that conditions of work are just and humane, and that there are adequate facilities for leisure and for social, religious and cultural life;
d that the health, safety and welfare of all persons in employment shall be safeguarded and not endangered or abused;
e that there are adequate medical and health facilities for all persons;
f that there is equal pay for equal work without discrimination on account of sex; and
g that children, young persons and the aged are protected against exploitation and against moral and material neglect.

Finally, Section 12 subsections 1, 2 and 4 provide thus:

1 The Government shall endeavour to ensure that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels to the people within the area of its authority.
2 The Federal Government shall take all possible steps to ensure that the educational opportunities available at all levels to persons in any area or part of the Federation are equal to those in any other area or part of the Federation.
4 The Government shall strive to eradicate illiteracy. To this end, subject to the availability of resources, the Government shall provide -
a Free compulsory and Universal Primary Education;

b Free Secondary Education;
c Free University Education; and
d Free Adult Literary Programme.

As if to give these socio-economic and political objectives a constitutional garb, Section 7(1) provides, without mincing words, that:

> It shall be the duty and responsibility of all organs of Government and all persons or authorities exercising executive, legislative or judicial functions to conform to, observe and apply the provisions of this Chapter of this Constitution.

True, that the idea of enshrining provisions relating to fundamental objectives and directive principles of State Policy into the Constitution is completely new in this country. One cannot but question the basis of Section 7(2) of the draft constitution when members of the CDC were of the view that 'the need for such provisions in the Nigerian Constitution is all the greater because of the heterogeneity of the society, the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, the growing cleavage between the social groupings, all of which combine to confuse the nation and bedevil the concerted march to orderly progress'. Section 7(2) of the draft constitution provides, *inter alia:*

> Subject to the provisions of subsection 3 of this section, no court of law shall have power to determine any issue or question as to whether any action or omission by any person or authority, or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with this Chapter of this Constitution.

In effect, the constitutional provisions relating to fundamental objectives and directive principles of State Policy are *non-justiciable.* In a layman's language, an aggrieved or a group of aggrieved persons cannot obtain a court's declaration as to whether or not some action or omission of the government or a public functionary is or is not a contravention or violation of the fundamental objectives or directive principles of State Policy.

In rejecting the proposal of its Sub-Committee on fundamental objectives that these provisions should be 'justiciable to a limited extent', the majority members of the CDC gave some reasons, not altogether convincing. First, the proposal, if accepted, would lead to constant conflicts between the Executive and/or the Legislature on the one hand and the Judiciary on the other. Second, that the provisions related to policy goals or directions rather than legal rights vested in any individual. Third, that because the provisions relating to fundamental objectives and directive principles are new, there can be no appropriate way of ensuring their observance.

If we are really serious about promoting 'a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of Nigeria', then we should incorporate into the draft constitution the proposal of the Sub-Committee on fundamental objectives and directive principles, namely, that:

> Within the context of a participatory democracy informed by the ideas of Liberty, Equality, and Justice, the State shall, as a long term goal strive towards a socialist order based on public ownership and control of the means of production and distribution.

The very arguments put forward by the CDC majority, as set out above, as to why the 'fundamental objectives' of the constitution should not be justiciable, are, in this author's opinion, the very reasons why the contrary view should prevail. Indeed, there is no other way of promoting 'a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of Nigeria', most of whom are riddled with poverty, ignorance and disease, except by ensuring the observance of the fundamental objectives and the directive principles of State Policy. Additionally, the fact that the provisions for fundamental objectives or directive principles enshrined in the draft constitution are new makes it all the more necessary and important that they should be *justiciable* otherwise the new Nigeria we hope to build 'is likely to find itself rudderless, with no sense of purpose and direction'. It would, therefore, be best were Section 7(2) deleted from the draft constitution.

Just as the recommendation of the Sub-Committee on the Executive and the Legislature that post-1979 Nigeria should operate an Executive Presidency has generated much discussions at the plenary session of the CDC, the provision for an Executive Presidency in the draft constitution also evoked much controversies among Nigerians in all walks of life. Those who expressed some misgivings about an Executive Presidency stressed the dangers of concentrating 'too much power in the hands of one person'. As some members of the CDC noted:

> A President with such wide powers and armed with the organised forces of the State could easily become a dictator, and could dismiss the Legislature which, as an institution, has no organised force under its control and no machinery for preventing usurpation of power by the executive. The stage is then set for personal rule by the President. The great tragedy of personal rule is its inhibiting effect on personal liberty.

Indeed, those who expressed some misgivings about an Executive Presidency have some justifications. Section 109(1) of the draft constitution provides:

> There shall be for the Republic a President and a Vice-President and for each state a Governor and a Deputy Governor who shall each be elected to office in accordance with the provisions of this constitution.

Section 109(2) also provides:

> The President shall be the Head of State and Chief Executive of the Federation and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation.

As the Chief Executive of the Federation, the President wields considerable power in terms of appointments to offices of Federal Ministers, Chairmen or members of Presidential Commissions and offices stipulated in Section 142(2) of the draft constitution subject to the *proviso* that in exercising his powers of appointment, the President 'shall have regard to the federal character of Nigeria'.

Although members of the CDC are aware that an Executive President with effective powers for national leadership' could abuse those powers without a vigilant legislature capable of acting as a check on Presidential powers, a provision that the

President could appropriate the necessary funds to carry on the services of the Government in the event of the Appropriation Bill not being passed by the National Assembly could not but enhance the powers of the President. Section 95 of the draft constitution provides *inter-alia:*

> If the Appropriation Bill in respect of any financial year has not been passed into law by the beginning of the financial year, the President may authorise the withdrawal of monies from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation for the purposes of meeting expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Government until the end of that financial year or the coming into operation of the Act whichever is the earlier.

If the President can have the necessary funds 'to carry on the services of the Government', what stops the President from invoking Section 95 of the Constitution whenever he has serious difficulties with the National Assembly? A Nigerian President, faced with serious problems could stay in power for some three to six months by invoking Section 95 regardless of the fact that the National Assembly has initiated impeachment proceedings against him as provided under Section 117 of the Constitution. In addition to the powers exercised by the President as the Chief Executive of the Federation, the President could invoke Item 61(a) of the Exclusive Legislative List to take over the powers and functions of a State Government.

What we have been saying so far is that the powers vested in the President are considerable, *more so* when Section 4(1) of the draft constitution provides (i) that no civil criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against the President, Vice-President, the Governor or Deputy Governor of a State while in office; (ii) that 'no process of any court requiring or compelling' his presence 'shall be applied for or issued'. In addition, his powers as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation include the powers to determine the operational use of the Armed Forces and the Police although he can delegate those powers to any members of the Armed Forces or any of his Ministers (Sections 162(3) and 167(3)).

Perhaps the misgivings expressed about an Executive Presidency are misplaced. First, because the President would have to depend on the National Assembly in order to implement his programmes even if his party is in the majority and more so if his party is in the minority, it is not possible for the President to ignore the wishes of the people expressed through their representatives in the National Assembly. Thus, the success and the effectiveness of the Executive Presidential system demand co-operation between the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government. Second, a President who ignores the wishes of the people or commits grave crimes or rules with dictatorial powers can be removed by the National Assembly under Section 117 of draft constitution. These powers of impeachment, and the fact they can be invoked act as serious checks on the Presidency. In any case, it would be a gratuitous insult to believe that a National Assembly would acquiesce when 'things are falling apart'. Thus, it would appear that we cannot eliminate all abuses of power by constitutional engineering.

At best, what we can do is to minimize the dangers: the provisions in the draft

constitution are such that can curb the excesses of any government, and the Executive Presidential system.

There is not room in a single short article to discuss all those provisions in the draft constitution which need particular attention from the Constituent Assembly – eg Treaty-making with Foreign Powers and other Friendly States. There are, however, one or two further facets of the Constitution which must be mentioned here.

One issue which in our view would create great political problems for this country is that of 'ethnic balancing', 'ethnic arithmetic', 'representativeness', 'quota system' or what have you. And, one can not but be disturbed that the members of the CDC are suggesting that top government positions at the federal and state levels should be 'representative' of the Nigerian community as if sharing the posts (whichever formula is adopted) is all that is necessary 'to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of Nigeria'. Indeed, the impression one gets is that members of the CDC believe that 'tribalism' is a venomous canker and the only way to cure it is to ensure that all the States or ethnic or occupational groups are represented in the inner-chamber of the government. We do not share these views. In fact, tribalism, in our view, is the politics of competitive modernisation. We cannot create a nation by constitutional engineering. We can only create one by getting rid of *ignorance*, *poverty* and *disease*, and it is our view that 'the pursuit of socialist ideology within the context of a democratic society is the only solid foundation upon which the happiness and prosperity of the people can be based'. The 'happiness and prosperity of the people' can hardly be based, in our view, on the number of top government posts allocated to their states, ethnic or sectional groups.

One final provision of the draft constitution to which we want to direct the attention of the members of the Constituent Assembly is Section 119(2) which reads thus:

> The President shall not declare a State of War between Nigeria and another country except with the sanction of a resolution of each of the Houses of the National Assembly.

In our view there should be a separate Section of the Constitution on the declaration of war. Second, while one respects the judgement of the forty-nine 'wise men' that the President shall not declare a State of War between Nigeria and another country without legislative authority, they should have considered circumstances in which it might be impossible for the National Assembly to meet let alone give the President a 'go-ahead' order. Thus, Section 119(2) should be rewritten and renumbered to read: 'The President shall not declare a State of War between Nigeria and another country except with the sanction of a resolution of each of the Houses of the National Assembly. Provided that the President shall take whatever measures necessary to protect the territorial integrity of the nation if he considers that it is not practicable to hold any meetings of the National Assembly'.

We have examined a number of issues which we believe would generate much

discussion among members of the Constituent Assembly when they meet in December 1977. We sincerely hope that members will have an atmosphere devoid of 'subterranean influences'. This is necessary if we are to have the first-ever autochthonous Nigerian Constitution which will have to be ratified by a referendum before it becomes the law of the land. To do otherwise is to deny the Constitution the right of its being called the Peoples Constitution.

The Ibadan Comfort Stations Programme: A Case-Study of the Community Development Approach to Environmental Health Improvement

D. PASTEUR*

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to present a case study of an innovative approach to the management of environmental health programmes in a large West African city. The case illustrates an attempt to tackle the problem of environmental health improvement through a process of partnership between public agencies and the community, using an approach which takes account of the distinctive socio-economic characteristics of a 'traditional' city. Environmental health improvement is an important priority in West African cities, and merits discussion in its own right: at the same time it is only one part of a wider problem of upgrading and development which confronts the older parts of these cities. The Comfort Stations programme therefore provides an opportunity to discuss some of the problems that would be associated with a more comprehensive programme of upgrading. Nigerian writers have pointed to the potential of the community development approach to the improvement of Ibadan[1]. The problems of Ibadan are repeated in other Yoruba towns of South West Nigeria, and with variations, in Nigeria as a whole. Trends in other countries also point towards greater use of a community development approach to upgrading of squatter settlements and slums.

The focus of this study is on the management process rather than on technical problems of health and engineering. The technical aspects of the programme are described as they are of interest to administrators, but they are not evaluated. The issues on which the case-study focuses are ones of administration, organization, and procedures, including those of communication with and participation by the community on the one hand, and wider issues of governmental structure on the

*Mr Pasteur is a lecturer in the Development Administration Group of the Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham.

[1]See A. G. Onikobukun: Nigeria, 'Strategies for Urban Redevelopment'. *Journal of the Royal Town Planning Institute, February*, 1972.
A. G. Onokerhoraye: 'Public Involvement in Urban Development Planning: the case of environmental sanitation in Ibadan'. *Journal of Administration Overseas, July*, 1977.

other. The case-study describes the evolution of the programme from its inception in 1969 to 1977, and presents the situation as at the latter date as a problem for discussion of strategies for the future continuation of the programme.

The City of Ibadan

Until recently Ibadan was the largest African city south of the Sahara and north of the Zambezi. It has been overtaken by Lagos and Kinshasa, but it still remains the city with the largest traditional or indigenous component. Many writers[1] have described the dual nature of the city with the congested and densely settled 'core area' that grew up from the origins of the city in 1820, surrounded by the much more extensive and less densely settled areas of the modern city surrounding it, which originated during the colonial period.

The 'Inner core' remains in many ways a traditional city both economically, socially and physically with strong links to the rural areas. Economically it is characterised by highly intensive small scale activity, particularly markets, but also small scale manufacturing and service activities: socially it retains the traditional patterns of extended family compounds under the family head or chief (*mogaji*), with land held by the family and its members under the traditional system of tenure: physically it is highly congested, its expansion is prevented by the encirclement of more modern areas of the city, and development is limited to individual efforts either of incremental improvement of structures, or rebuilding to improved standards or for new land uses. A process of modernization and change is taking place in the inner core in all these dimensions, but it is a spontaneous and organic process of change, and there have effectively been no efforts at planned change, restructuring, or intervention by the public authorities. The area remains from one viewpoint the heart and soul of the city, but from another viewpoint it can be regarded as an anomaly in stark contrast to the modern central business district, industrial areas, government offices, educational institutions and residential layouts which surround the core and which since the oil boom have started to expand rapidly. Planned intervention in the upgrading of the core areas seems inevitable in one form or another. Environmental conditions and the absence in many areas of adequate services and access roads are one reason for this: another reason is the economic inefficiency caused by the congestion in the traffic and markets system which are an essential part of the interaction between the core area and the surrounding city.

The following population estimates were made by consultants (see below) in 1971:

	1963 *Census*	1969	1980	2000
Ibadan City Council Area	630,000	562,474	—	—
Master Plan Study Area	—	581,777	802,860	1,452,000
Inner Core Area	—	467,673	501,078	534,483

[1]See L. H. Muench, Town Planning and the Social Sysetm, in M. Koll ed African Urban Development, Bertelsmann Universitats Verlag Dusseldorf; 1970.
A. L. Mabogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria, London U.P. 1978.

The 1969, 1980 and 2000 figures are for resident population, and it is acknowledged that population in Ibadan is swelled by a large day-time influx and is hence difficult to estimate. The density of population in the innder core in 1969 was estimated at 140 persons per acre as compared to 30 ppa in the high income residential area.

Environmental Health Problems in Ibadan

In 1969 the Federal and Western State Governments with UNDP assistance jointly commissioned a study for the preparation of Master Plans for sewerage, drainage and solid wastes disposal. The study was undertaken for the WHO as executing agency by consultants and completed in 1971, with an interim report submitted in 1670.[1] The study summarised the existing sanitation facilities in the inner core as follows:[2]

a Provision for the disposal of excreta is by salga facilities (pit latrines), a conservancy service covering only a limited population (20,000 approx), and to a lesser extent septic tanks and soakaway pits. Pit latrines, while usually well constructed, encounter problems arising from soil conditions and rock, and the need for renewal. Public health and aesthetic problems arise from the practice of desludging old pits by spreading the contents on the ground surface in the immediate vicinity. Considerable health hazards arise from the nature and method of operation of the conservancy service. Septic tank effluent is frequently discharged to adjacent streams.

b Grey (domestic) waters and industrial waste waters are discharged to the surface drainage system. The separation of domestic waste water from sewage disposal, resulting partly from the limited water supply in the area (consisting in large part of standpipes), both increases the health hazard from sewage, and results in pollution of streams and accumulation of stagnant pools.

c A number of public facilities exist, consisting of aqua privies, pit latrines, and pail latrines. All pose problems of maintenance and only in the aqua privies can reasonably healthy conditions be expected.

d It was estimated by the Health Department that about 10% of the population of the Inner Core have no facilities as evidenced by the extensive use of vacant lands and stream banks as latrine areas.

e Urban stormwater run-off is conveyed in unlined earth surface drains to the many streams and rivers: these are often also used for the disposal of refuse and for the location of communal refuse dumps. These 'receiving waters' are thus heavily polluted which severly limits downstream use of water and causes severe damage to the aesthetic environment. The practice of using streams for emergency drinking water supply constitutes an obvious hazard and even contact with polluted water for bathing and washing is not free of risk.

f Wells are still in use by some for emergency water supplies, and these run the risk of pollution.

---

[1] Maclaren International Ltd., in association with Urwick Currie and Partners Ltd., Master Plan for Wastes Disposal and Drainage: Immediate Measures Report 1970: and Final Report, 1971, Volume I Summary Report, Volume II Basic Data and Special Studies, Volume III Sewerage, Volume IV Drainage and Solid Wastes.

[2] *Ibid:* Summarised from Volume III of the Final Report, Chapter 1, The Existing System.

In the newer areas of the city most premises are served by septic tanks and some large institutional, commercial or industrial establishments have their own sewage treatment plants.

The study presented available statistics of diseases such as schistosomiasis, dysentry, typhoid, and of infant mortality. Statistics relating to Ibadan and particularly to the Inner Core were limited, but the study summarised its view as follows:

'While the foregoing data are not definitive, they provide an illustration of the extent and relative importance of diseases associated with sanitation, and the disease on which the provision of improved sanitation facilities will exert a diminishing effect'.[1]

In 1971, there was a cholera epidemic in Ibadan resulting in a number of deaths in areas of the Inner Core, though none in the area of the pilot project, a fact which was put to good effect in subsequent publicity.

The Origin of the Comfort Stations Programme

The consultants presented an 'immediate measures programme' for sewerage for implementation in 1970–72, followed by first, second, and third stage programmes up to 1980, 1990 and 2000 respectively. The highest priority under immediate measures was given to improving private domestic facilities in the Inner Core, and the method chosen for this was the Comfort Station, 'an essentially private facility, serving a family group of approximately 100 to 300 persons in a compound area'. Other components of the immediate measures programme were improvements to the conservancy service, increased provision of public facilities in places such as markets, and the establishment of a new organisation, the Ibadan Wastes Disposal Board, to undertake the full programme of sewerage, drainage and solid waste disposal. The sewerage programme would consist of a network of sanitary sewers to extend over the city as a whole including the Inner Core. But the conversion of premises in the Inner Core to individual waterborne sanitation and even the elimination of the conservancy service, was to be a long term process, and it was proposed that construction of Comfort Stations should continue through the third stage to the year 2000, subject to their proving themselves in a pilot study.

Following the completion and monitoring of a pilot project in 1970 it was proposed that a further 25 stations be undertaken in 1971-2, and the Master Plan envisaged a total of 2,500 to cover the requirements of the Inner Core up to the year 2000, with 500 of these being built by 1980. The following are the main features of the Comfort Station concept:

a a Comfort Station consists of a block containing toilet, bathing and clothes washing facilities: there are alternative methods of providing each of these, and alternative layouts to suit site or social considerations. Typically each household has its own toilet within the block.

b Initially the aqua privy method of disposal is being used, the block being constructed over a large septic tank: only when the sanitary sewer is both constructed

[1] *Ibid:* Master Plan Study, Volume II, Chapter 5.

and accessible can a waterborne (flush) system be used.

c Land is donated or allocated by the community, which in the Inner Core is to a large extent still organised on the basis of family compounds. Vacant areas of land often exist in the compound for the purpose of refusal disposal. In some cases members of a family have not built on their share of the land.

d Labour is provided either on a self-help basis or by contributions of money in lieu. The public authority contributes the whole cost of the materials and provides technical advice and supervision over the construction process. Experience has however caused this clear division to be modified (see below), as well as the method of construction.

e The most important site requirements are suitable ground conditions, availability of water and electricity supply, and vehicular access to permit desludging where an aqua privy is used.

f In 1970 costs of an aqua privy unit were estimated at N5,200, comprising N2,600 for labour and N2,600 for materials.

g Maintenance is the responsibility of the community group, with the provision of needed public services on payment (such as desludging). Cost elements were estimated at:

	N
Salary of attendant	256
Water	250
Electricity	100
Cleaning equipment etc.	40
Yearly reserve for painting and cleaning of aqua privy	62
	708

The cost of the attendant is normally elimated by sharing out the task of maintenance on a communal basis.

The Evolution of the Programme 1970-77

a The Pilot Project

Concurrently with the conduct of the study by consultants, the WHO Project Staff in conjunction with Nigerian counterpart staff from the State Government, Ministry of Works and Housing, and Ibadan City Council, in 1969 initiated a pilot project, choosing for this an area where there was an established community organisation. The Oke Padi-Oke Seni Community Development Association was established in 1964 covering 21 family compounds with a population of over 6,000 people. The Association had already undertaken a number of improvement projects. Acting through the progressive leadership of the Association, one family compound consisting of eight households and 114 persons was selected for the first Comfort Station.

b Achievements since 1971

By the end of 1972, 24 Comfort Stations had been initiated, ie virtually the

whole target figure, although only three had been completed. By the end of 1975, sixteen had been completed and a further six added to those initiated. By October 1977 the total completed and in use was 24, with a further five completed, eleven under construction, four agreed by the communities and a few more still under discussion. Thus after a promising start the programme by 1977 had fallen well behind target, though it was still alive.

c The Ward Health Council

In 1972 a Ward Health Council was set up in Ward NW3, one of Ibadan's 47 wards, with a population of some 15,500 in 133 compounds. This Ward embraced the Oke Padi-Oke Seni CD Association and the Council shared some of its leadership. The Council was instrumental in promoting the idea of Comfort Stations and other health measures. Since then one further Council was formed in Ward SW 4/5 with the co-operation of the Regional Health Education Centre, University of Ibadan.

d Project Organisation

In 1973 the WHO Project Staff completed their assignment, and full responsibility for the sewerage programme was assumed by the newly-formed Ibadan Wastes Disposal Board (IWDB)[1] whose staff included a number of the project counterparts and staff transferred from Ibadan City Council. The structure of IWDB and its relationship to other government agencies are shown in Figure I. The staff included a Community Development Officer, this post being filled by a person who had been most prominent in the leadership of the Oke-Padi-Oke Seni CD Association and the Ward Health Council, and who had in the interim been trained overseas in Community Development. In 1976 he resigned and was replaced by a Health Superintendent from within the IWDB, whose training included health education, and who had considerable familiarity with the Inner Core. The CDO has worked on his own without supporting staff. Technical assistance has been provided by the Design and Construction Division of IWDB.

e Local Government Reform

In late 1976 following the national reform of the local government system in Nigeria, an elected Council was formed for Ibadan to replace the previous appointed Management Board. In October 1977 the Council set up Area Committees in each of its 27 electoral Wards, with the Ward Councillor as Chairman and an appointed membership of local leaders. The Committees are intended to act as a two-way channel of communication with the public, particularly for the formulation of development proposals to be undertaken by the Council, and to provide support for Council policies, especially revenue collection.

Procedures and Problems of the Programme

The following paragraphs will describe the procedures adopted in the Comfort

[1]Since the field work for this study was undertaken, the IWDB has been abolished and re-absorbed into the Ministry of Works and Housing.

Stations programme which can be divided into three phases of management. First the introduction of the idea, gaining acceptance in principle and on details such as land and finance: secondly the development phase covering construction: and thirdly the utilization and maintenance phase. An assessment will be made, at a general level, of the main problems encountered at each of these phases which have tended to act as constraints on the programme, and in most cases continue to do so: and the survey will seek to expose the most important management procedures and relationships entailed in the programme, so as to form a basis for discussion of current management issues. This assessment draws on the study undertaken in 1973-75 by the head of the African Regional Health Education Centre at the University of Ibadan,[1] and on the opinions of IWDB staff on the problems currently being faced.

The Introduction Phase

a Gaining acceptance, and briefing procedure

The approach adopted has been one of community involvement and participation: it was recognised at the outset that Comfort Stations would not achieve their objectives in health terms nor would they be properly maintained unless the community and individuals within the community felt committed to the idea. The pilot project harnessed the favourable attitudes of an existing community development organisation. Subsequent projects have received encouragement from the early success, some have gained momentum from the work of the Ward Health Council, and others from the publicity arising from the cholera outbreak. The normal procedure has been for the CD worker, first under the WHO project and subsequently in the IWDB, to look out for potential family groups which might be interested in a Comfort Station, and for sites with suitable access. The approach may come either from the family or the CD worker. Once initial interest has been shown a series of meetings will be held, usually in the evening when all members of the group are available. The project will be explained, at first in general terms, and then in detail until agreement is reached. Where there is disagreement within the group eg over the allocation of land, or financial contributions, the CD worker will hope that social pressure will be exerted.

b Land, Access and Siting

While vacant areas of land are available and are often already in use as a communal dumping area for refuse, they may well be the share of family land allocated to one member of the family who is unwilling to see potentially valuable building land turned over to a communal latrine. In the view of the IWDB, land represents the strongest constraint against more rapid progress.

Access is another problem due to the limited number of roads and tracks in the Inner Core, and to the limit of distance from a road that can be reached by the pumping equipment presently available to IWDB.

[1]Dr Z. A. Ademuwagun. *A Study of the Health Education Component of the Comfort Stations in Ibadan, Nigeria:* (financed by World Health Organization), African Regional Health Education Centre, University of Ibadan, October, 1975.

c Community Contributions

The early projects called for 'self-help' contributions of labour to cover the construction, with the materials being provided by the authorities. For those unable or unwilling to provide labour, it was possible to commute to a financial contribution. It soon became clear that most people preferred to make financial contributions and that the construction process was difficult to manage on this mixed basis, and financial contributions are now the rule, the total required from a family compound being N800 which was the labour cost of the early projects. The same figure has been retained up to 1977 despite significant increases in costs. The IWDB has taken the view that the important thing is to secure commitment rather than to cover costs: an increase in contributions would probably antagonize people who have tended to be very unwilling to part with even small payments to government agencies. The apportionment of contributions within the family group is a matter for them to decide. As soon as the full sum is collected and paid over, the project can go ahead. IWDB requires no further written agreement. The land in any case remains in the family's ownership. For the record a list of the members of the compound is kept by IWDB. A written commitment would only lead to suspicion, eg that the land might be acquired by government.

d Capital Funds

The pilot project was financed by a contribution from USAID. The next 25 Comfort Stations were financed by a loan from UNDP. Since then funds have been included annually in the State Government's Development budget under the allocations for the IWDB. In 1976/7 an allocation of N250,000 was made for 20 units and in 1977/78 an allocation of N130,000 has been made for 10 units. The reduced number is due to the slower rate of progress than expected rather than to shortage of capital funds, but IWDB hopes to be able to accumulate unspent funds from 1976/77 for use when more projects can be initiated.

THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE

a Design

IWDB uses standard designs based on early experience in the programme. The choice of design is only one of layout and size which are dictated by characteristics of the site and population to be served. These are not matters over which the family group can be asked to exercise any choice, nor are there any areas in which the IWDB consider the community can be asked to make decisions.

b Materials Supply

In earlier stages of the programme delays were caused by a shortage of materials such as cement, arising from the nationwide supply situation. This tended to discourage groups which had committed themselves and made their financial contributions.

c Construction

After the abandonment of voluntary labour, construction had been either by contract or direct labour. Current opinion in IWDB is that the contract method is

preferable. Construction costs have risen from N4,000 approx. in 1971 to N12,000 in 1977. IWDB is capable of providing the technical services for design and supervision at the present level of the programme and given continuance of the standard design, but with the shortage of staff currently being experienced would find it difficult to handle a larger programme, given commitments on other aspects of the sewerage and drainage programme.

The Utilization and Maintenance Phase

The Ademuwagun Report showed that while in general the idea of Comfort Stations had been accepted by the family compounds concerned, and the level of use was reasonable, a number of factors were affecting the level of use and preventing the programme reaching to full potential.

a Attitudes to Sanitation

There is a tendency for ingrained habits to persist and a failure by some to use the new facilities. The study found that despite the unsatisfactory environmental conditions in the city, personal habits of cleanliness were in many respects satisfactory. On the other hand the majority of people were not accustomed to linking poor sanitary conditions with their state of personal health.

b Level of Participation

It was found that a significant proportion (about 50%) of adults had not been involved directly in the planning stage of the projects, and were therefore less committed to their success. Leadership groups were both more committed, and, by virtue of better education, better able to absorb the public health implications.

c Public Utility Services

Neither water supply nor electricity supply have been entirely reliable in Ibadan. Absence of water seriously affects the washing and toilet cleansing facilities, and power cuts discourage use of the facilities at night.

d Public Utility Costs

One of the most serious problems has been the failure to meet water and electriciy bills, resulting in mounting arrears followed by the cutting off of supply, or in some cases the closure of the wash-house so as to save water. The study shows the following position for the pilot project compound:

		N
Water	Total charges incurred October 1970 to March 1974	372.53
	Total paid	117.10
	Outstanding debt	255.43
Electricity	Total charges	10.00
	Total paid	6.00
	Outstanding debt	4.00

Two factors have contributed to this situation: first the excessive use of water, either due to waste or unauthorised use by non-members of the compound: secondly the cost of utility services, especially water. Water has been supplied

through meters and charged at the metered tariff rate applicable to industrial consumers. Domestic consumers in Ibadan are not metered and are charged on a flat rate system. Tariffs in Ibadan in 1976-77 were as follows:

Industrial and Commercial supplies (metered)	53 Kobo per 1000 galls
Domestic water rate for standpipe supply (applicable to large areas of Inner Core)	N2 per annum
Domestic water rate for individual connections (non metered): charge per family for up to 200 sq ft of floor space	N2 per month

(N1=100 Kobo=£0.90=US $1.55 approx)

IWDB has approached the Oyo State Water Corporation with a request to modify the tariff so as to reduce the burden of costs, but this has been turned down: one reason given was that a flat rate or subsidised tariff would encourage waste.

e Maintenance

The level of maintenance has not always been satisfactory: where this has been shared among members of the community, not all have done their share. Where a paid attendant has been engaged he has not always been paid. There have also been failures to maintain and repair the structures.

Conclusions and the Way Ahead

The position at the end of 1977 regarding the Comfort Stations programme can be summarised as follows. As a method of providing domestic facilities for the Inner Core it has been proved acceptable and appropriate in social terms; it has been proved technically feasible; and it has been proved administratively and financially feasible. At the same time it faces constraints on all these fronts which combine to make it apparently difficult to achieve more. The scale of achievement in the seven years since 1970 falls far short of the needs for the population of the Inner Core. At the present rate the programme will barely realise the 1980 target by the year 2000. Yet its achievements to date indicate that this innovative programme presents an opportunity for a major breakthrough in tackling the problems of the Inner Core. In conclusion this article will examine the constraints faced by the programme, the issues – technical, social, managerial, financial and wider questions of governmental organization and urban policy - which they raise, and some possible solutions.

a Technical Issues

The programme is limited by the need for occasional access by the desludging vehicle to areas close to roads or tracks: that is, unless there is a technical means of extending the distance that can be reached by pumping. Otherwise the programme sooner or later becomes dependent on the extension of roads under a wider upgrading programme.

b Social Issues

So far only persuasion has been used to secure individual surrender of land for the communal purpose. To pursue this more rigorously would require more

effort by community development staff. Incentives such as financial compensation from public funds, or the allocation of a plot elsewhere might speed the process up. It seems most unlikely that compulsory action towards individuals or compound groups would be a productive approach: there must be co-operation and participation. Maintenance is another social issue and is not only dependent on the level of costs, but also on the leadership and organization of the compound group.

c Management Issues

While the sanitation programme as a whole had institutional identity in the IWDB, it is still not much better off for staff than the average Nigerian municipal agency, and within the organization the more prestigious and visible sewerage activities tend to take precedence. The project has established the viability of the community development and partnership approach, but has not attracted the commitment required to make it really successful.

A Comfort Stations project team with clear leadership, an increase in CD staff, and technical staff available on an adequate scale if not full time, would all be helpful in an expanded programme. The success of a programme such as this one, undertaken in a traditional and sensitive social context requires, above all, the deployment of staff with community development skills in addition to technical skills. An increase in the staff of the CD section, whether primarily trained in health inspection or community development, would yield benefits both at the initiating and the maintenance phases of the programme.

d Financial Issues

The compound members are meeting an ever-decreasing proportion of construction costs as these grow with inflation, and if subsidies for water and for electricity charges are to be entertained, the level of subsidy would be even greater. It is often argued that subsidies for the upgrading of urban areas are not justified given even greater priorities for rural development, and that urban communities should pay for what they get. On the other hand the social benefits of sanitation programmes are considerable, not only to the participants, but to the rest of the community through savings in health service costs. There are also considerable potential benefits from the acceptance of upgrading in the health field, as it could open the door to further forms of partnership with public agencies in a comprehensive upgrading programme. There is therefore a strong case for softening the burden of utility charges, particularly water. For the answer to this, one has to turn to the tariff of the Water Corporation.

On the one hand the Corporation accepts the principle of subsidy since the charges for standpipes in the core area are at a low flat-rate level, and the Corporation itself is subsidised by the State Government. On the other hand it is anxious to deter waste from individual taps and wash-houses and has chosen to apply a

metered economic rate to the Comfort Stations. Both economy and subsidy could be achieved in a compromise under which the tariff allowed consumption up to a certain level at a subsidised rate, followed by a progressive charge for larger amounts. The principle of self-sufficiency of urban areas would be preserved by levying higher charges on more wealthy consumers in other parts of the city, whether domestic or industrial.

e *Wider Issues of Governmental Organization*

This is a programme which is not reaching its potential. The reason cannot be that there is a shortage of funds, since the amounts required are small in relation to the State's Development Budget. That the programme has potential is not necessarily the general view, since it lacks visibility, political appeal and professional achievement as compared to larger programmes. The problem is thus partly one of attitudes to this sort of programme in this sort of area and income group. At the same time this type of approach to environmental health is receiving increasing favour internationally, and this could support the local initiative. The case does also draw attention to the question of governmental organization and co-ordination for urban development. Is there a Ministry or co-ordinating body at State level responsible for giving the programme a boost when it flags, and stimulating the Water Corporation for example to be more flexible on its water tariffs: or for engaging the support of political leaders in the Municipal Government and its Area Committees now that they have been established? Finally is the programme's connection with, and probably also dependence on the wider process of upgrading in the inner core being explored? The introduction of roads and community services will require much more space and hence demolition than Comfort Stations, and will also need to be planned over a larger physical area than that covered by the traditional family compound. Even if the layout of services that would be 'superimposed' takes maximum account of existing tracks and open spaces, there will need to be some degree of compulsion in addition to persuasion, social pressure and incentives. Participation and consultation will tend to be with wider representative groups rather than compound communities, though the latter will still be involved at certain points. There will need to be 'overspill' areas, presumably some distance away on the edge of the city where those displaced can be resettled in new communities, preferably with income opportunities.

The Comfort Stations programme has something to offer the wider programme in its experience of development partnership, and it establishes the precedent from which a wider programme can be started. At the same time its current administrative, participatory, and financial incentive procedures are not sufficient for a wider programme, nor can it provide 'overspill' land. The Comfort Stations programme will thus benefit from the introduction of a full upgrading programme of which in any case it is a part. Perhaps the sooner this is done, the better.

IBADAN WASTES DISPOSAL BOARD
Organization structure and relationships with other agencies 1977

FIG. I



Quarterly Notes

BRITAIN - Fourth National Research Development Conference

The University of Strathclyde provided the venue for the Fourth National Development Research Conference which was held at Baird Hall, Glasgow between the 26th and 29th September 1978. It was officially hosted by the David Livingstone Institute of Overseas Development Studies and jointly organized by the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex and the recently-formed Development Studies Association for whom the occasion represented their first annual conference. A diverse programme attracted over 190 participants to this successful conference which consisted both of plenary sessions and workshops.

The opening plenary session was held on Tuesday afternoon and chaired by James Pickett. Professor Walter Newlyn the retiring chairman of the DSA presented a paper entitled 'Thoughts of World Development' in which he discussed the concern of the New International Economic Order with the contradictions between basic needs strategies and maximization of industrial growth strategies. In the second plenary session on Thursday morning Dr Robert Gardner discussed 'Rich Country Responses to Developing Country Demand' with Professor Alec Nove providing the reply. The third and final plenary session, held on Thursday afternoon and chaired by Emil Rado consisted of a panel discussion on 'Setting Priorities for Development Studies'. Among the panel members, Robert Porter from ODM discussed the limitations of small-scale micro studies and suggested the need for 'synthesising' of general evidence, Philip Leeson mentioned the need for research on the theory and function of the State while Robert Chambers of IDS called for introspection and self-critical examination by social scientists to reduce the biased perceptions of reality which so often occurred in research. Other panel members were Ronald Dore and Aidan Foster-Carter.

An innovation in the workshop sessions was the introduction of one-hour research papers as well as the traditional half-hour research summaries. Forty-four sessions were held under twenty different topics which ranged from such theoretical aspects of development research as 'Dependency' and 'Cultural Imperialism' through to such pragmatic aspects as 'Health in Developing Countries' and 'Technology and Development'. 'Rural Development' provided the most popular topic with five workshop sessions devoted to this issue, with papers primarily from Africa and covering a range of subjects from agricultural admini-

stration to irrigation projects. Other well represented topics included 'Regional Development and Planning', 'Distribution of Incomes and Wealth' and 'Labour Markets and Employment Policy'. Here, by contrast the papers were mainly from Latin America and included studies on manual workers, market traders and street occupations.

On Wednesday evening the AGM of the DSA was held during which the new constitution was adopted and Keith Griffin elected as the Association's new president. Two 'development' films were shown on Thursday evening, and among a number of additional meetings held was one chaired by Dudley Seers to discuss the possibility of holding a conference at IDS in 1979 on 'Teaching Development Studies'. This diverse and interesting conference closed after the final lunch on Friday.

(contributor: Caroline Moser)

BRITAIN - 39th FID Congress

The 39th Congress of the International Federation for Documentation (FID) was held in Edinburgh, Sept. 25-28, 1978 on the theme 'New trends in documentation and information'. Sessions covered developments in the theoretical basis of information (including linguistics); new trends in technology and their application in information handling which ranged from electronic publishing, through SDI services to reprographics; new developments in information retrieval systems; the organisation and management of information; and professional development, manpower and training. While many of the papers concentrated on purely technical aspects of information storage and retrieval, including a discussion of the likely impact of microprocessors, the importance of the user was emphasized by a number of speakers. This is encouraging, as the needs of the group for whom all these efforts are being made have too often been overlooked in the excitement of experimenting with new technologies. Of interest to developing countries was a discussion on information as a resource v. information as a right, with its implications for international information systems and the growth of national information systems.

The congress was organised as a series of open plenary sessions with a small number of invited papers and a larger number of contributed papers, with the result that relatively little time could be devoted to discussion of many of them. In view of the size of the congress (about 300 listed delegates from most parts of the world) a workshop or topic group structure would enable delegates to explore more fully those papers that were of particular interest to them. Further details of the Congress can be obtained from Aslib, 3 Belgrave Square, London S.W.1.

(contributor: Mary Kempe)

United Nations – Integrated Rural Development

An inter-regional symposium on integrated rural development was held in Berlin in September 1977 and sponsored jointly by SIDA (the Swedish International

Development Authority) and DSE (the German Foundation for International Development) with FAO's technical assistance and participation.*

The symposium sought to formulate a basic needs approach for any integrated rural development programme.

Reading the Report which has been carefully prepared and competently produced, one is struck by the lack of any clear cut action – oriented policy guidelines, instead, alas probably all too inevitably, the same old well-intentioned objectives are reiterated, but too often jargon-ridden language which will be of little assistance to those in the field who want to get on with the job. Such remarks as 'participatory native or otherwise of the Government needs to be looked into' and 'one major step . . . ' is to 'have a social minimum . . . which would imply adoption of a social maximum', 'programmes for women have a key role (in the) approach to population control', are in turn banal, obtuse and platitudinous. The trouble with an inter-regional meeting of this kind is that it is inevitably so generalised in its conclusions as to be of very limited value only. The regional consultations referred to were possibly of much greater value.

*The report of the symposium is published by FAO. Part I contains M. A. Zaman's background paper prepared for the symposium.

Book Reviews

The United Nations System: coordinating its economic and social work, MARTIN HILL; *Cambridge University Press*, 1978; pp 252; £13.50.

Coordination of economic and social work in the United Nations system has been a major problem from the earliest days of the organisation; this book is an authoritative account of the measures needed to achieve sufficient coordination to enable the system to function and escape confusion and disorder. It is authoritative because Martin Hill was the key person in the coordination machinery which was evolved to deal with the problem He advanced the evolution of the machinery and he here records its performance and its inadequacies; he greatly helped to prepare the way for the major structural improvements in the United Nations system which are now coming into effect. Indeed this book is based on a paper sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and offered to the United Nations Expert Group which prepared the report on 'A new UN structure for global economic cooperation', whose thinking it evidently influenced.

The functional decentralisation to a family of Specialised Agencies which was decided upon by the designers of the United Nations system made coordination a prerequisite of effective operation. It was accordingly laid down in the Charter that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was, under the General Assembly, to be the coordinating authority and that it should establish relations with the (autonomous) agencies which would regulate the system as a whole. A related cause of difficulty was the geographical dispersal of the United Nations system which developed on a scale not originally contemplated when Geneva and New York were the twin poles. This development brought with it further divergences in policy and practice against which no countervailing tendency operated. As Martin Hill wryly remarks, 'One cannot but be struck by the relative lack of importance attached, in those early days, as well as later, to the effects in terms of efficiency, costs and difficulties of coordination inherent in the geographical separation of the different organisations'.

Apart from the empire-building or deliberate encroachment to be expected among newly-established institutions, there were many instances of parallel developments and natural overlaps in the normal range of agencies' activities which were quite sufficient to provide a full agenda for a coordinating authority. But, as Martin Hill

records, "an underlying and pervasive problem is, of course, the absence of co-ordination at the national level in regard to international policies and programmes. The weakness and rareness of policy coordination in many Governments has led not only to divergent positions being taken by the representatives of the same country in different organisations but also not infrequently . . . to divergent decisions actually being reached". And, notes the author, despite remonstrances, "little overall improvement in the situation appears to have occurred".

The mechanism devised to coordinate these heterogeneous practical and policy issues operated under the authority of the ECOSOC but at the administrative level; it was known as the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) and was composed of the several executive heads of the specialised agencies chaired by the United Nations Secretary-General. It was assisted by numerous subordinate bodies the most important being the Preparatory Committee (Prep Comm) of which Martin Hill was the Chairman. This was a working-level committee of senior agency officials, themselves concerned with many of the problems coming before the Committee, which sought to resolve as many difficulties as possible without reference to ACC, and to reduce to essentials those questions which had to be submitted to it for decision. As chairman Martin Hill's position gave him great influence over ACC's agenda and the disposal of its business. As Secretary-General Dr Waldheim writes in his preface, Martin Hill "occupies a special place among international officials". This was largely due to his responsibilities and his work as chairman. To illustrate the growth and the complexity of the problems with which he and Prep Comm had to deal it may be noted that ACC started as a manageable group of six or seven agency heads sitting with the United Nations Secretary-General supported by two or three senior United Nations officials (these having comparable responsibility though not the status of agency heads). By the time Martin Hill retired from the United Nations the ACC comprised thirteen executive heads of specialised agencies and the chief officers of UNDP, UNCTAD, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNEP, WFP, UNITAR, the High Commissioner for Refugees, UNRWA, GATT and the Under-Secretary of the United Nations for economic and social affairs. At a regular closed meeting of ACC more than 60 people including advisers are likely to be present. Martin Hill comments 'a major organisational problem facing the Committee is that it has become not only too heterogeneous but too large'. Unlike the British Cabinet the ACC had no capacity to evolve an inner-ACC; all members were equal and there was no Prime Minister.

The authority and performance of ACC were adequate for the original activities of the first specialised agencies. When major operational responsibilities began to shift the agencies' centre of gravity and new differently structured agencies were established little attempt was made to adjust ACC functions. Coordination was accordingly sought and achieved through other channels and in other sometimes extra-constitutional places. The need for coordination remained quite as acute as Martin Hill concludes, 'Nor will one ever be able to reconcile completely (though one constantly seeks accommodations) the fundamental contradictions (a) between the autonomy of each inter-governmental organisation and the desire for a unified United Nations policy or programme; and (b) as regards operational activities

between decisions taken and priorities established by the central inter-governmental organs and those of individual countries under their country programme'. It was to the resolution of such problems as these that he devotes the conclusions and suggestions which are presented in this book.

As Dr Davidson Nicol, Executive Director of UNITAR emphasises in his Preface to the book the central issue is the role and functioning of ECOSOC. Given strong leadership from the General Assembly and the rationalisation of the Council's own work and procedures it would be possible to bring about the essential changes in ACC and in its mode of operation.

Martin Hill presented proposals in this connection which the Group of Experts on the United Nations system made its own and which have lately been put into effect. These are changes which Martin Hill would have greatly welcomed as an advance toward the better functioning of the United Nations system as a totality which he sought so devotedly throughout his career.

HAROLD CAUSTIN

Training in the Civil Service, R. A. W. RHODES (editor); *Joint University Council for Social and Public Administration,* 1977; pp 85; £1.55.

The seven papers that provide the substance of this publication are based on the subjects and discussions of a conference arranged in Birmingham in 1977 by the Public Administration Committee of the Joint University Council for Social and Public Administration. The purpose of that conference was to allow the PAC to review its opinions and attitudes on Civil Service Training in Britain. The conference considered principally the justifications for training in the public sector, the alternative patterns of such training, and the possible objectives and methods of a Central College in Civil Service Training. In addition to a treatment of these direct themes, the papers now published include an appraisal of current issues in management training, a reference to the significance of these issues for Management Development in Local Government, and a critical comment on the programme of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, an institution which, as stated in the Editor's introduction, 'has exerted an almost fatal fascination over some British commentators for many years, seeming to be the holy grail of training'. Copies of the Birmingham conference papers and discussion notes were sent to the Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons which has been considering training as part of its review of the post-Fulton Civil Service. This present volume represents a further initiative of the PAC in anticipation of a meeting it seeks to arrange with those responsible for Civil Service training.

The editorial introduction describes the aim of this publication as the clarification of the major issues of Civil Service training, rather than as an attempt to present definite conclusions or renovative proposals for the future of training. In the event, the papers are frequently prescriptive as well as analytical in their treatment of the conference themes. It is difficult to see how these two approaches could be separated for discussion purposes, given the circumstances in which the conference met

and the nature of the subjects it elected to examine. By nature of their status and experience, the authors of the seven papers are well qualified to comment perceptively on the present provisions for Civil Service training in this country and the extent to which uncertainty about objectives may continue to hinder a more effective analysis of training requirements for a continuously expanding public sector establishment.

The present publication is focused on British institutional requirement where many of the diagnoses and implied remedies can carry meaning only within that environment. There are at the same time a number of issues examined which have relevance for public administration systems in other places. One would wish this publication to reach an international audience. More than we sometimes suspect, or are prepared to admit, the state and stage of Civil Service training in Britain bears resemblance to circumstances overseas for which we provide an array of training consultants and training technologies. Perhaps, next, another conference at Birmingham to explore with our counterpart overseas the common dimensions of training problems that frequently have found no greater resolution here than they have elsewhere.

A. S. LIVINGSTONE

Documents on Contemporary British Government, Volumes 1 and 2, MARTIN MINOGUE (Ed); *Cambridge University Press*, 1977; pp 413, £11.00 hardback, £3.95 paperback.

Britain's Public Administration literature includes few books of readings. In a field of study in which Parliamentary papers and government publications abound and form the basis of much national policy and state action, this is both remarkable and regrettable. These documents are often expensive to buy, and for many people difficult to borrow.

The book of readings that extracts the salient passages of these papers and reports and makes them more widely available thus renders a valuable service to teachers and students of public administration – and also to practitioners who like to understand the broader setting in which they perform their daily tasks. In compiling two such volumes under the general title *Documents on Contemporary British Government:* Martin Minogue, Senior Lecturer, Department of Administrative Studies, University of Manchester, puts us in his debt.

Both these volumes contain extracts from the many substantial reports published over the last ten to fifteen years on major aspects of government and administration, central and local. They also include passages from important books and journal articles relating to salient features of these reports. The author has written general introductions to both volumes and commentaries on each of their main sections. The latter are generally headed by an apt quotation, many of which give an amusing as well as historical perspective to the subject concerned. Each volume concludes with a select bibliography classified in accordance with the structure of that volume.

The second volume on *Local Government in Britain* covers a more compact and manageable subject than the first. It brings together, in a systematic way, basic material relating to the reorganisation of the local government systems of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In so doing it sets out the variety of considerations that animated the radical reforms that have lately been undertaken – at not inconsiderable cost to the nation's taxpayers.

This book will surely be a standard work in the literature on local government for a long time to come.

The first volume on *British Government and Constitutional Change* was by its nature less easy to order than the second. It is arguable that some of the material included – for example, on public expenditure (PESC and PAR) and on the Civil Service (the much publicised and perhaps over-rated Fulton Report) is more concerned with public service management than with the country's basic constitution. The section on The Impact of the European Community comes at the end of the book and occupies only 30 pages against 70 pages devoted to the preceding section on the Devolution of Government to Scotland and Wales. It will be interesting to see how well the balance and priorities of these two sections stand the test of time.

In the 1960's there was a range of interest in Britain in governmental reform, a development that was congenial to Harold Wilson (an exceptionally young Prime Minister) and one to which he was very ready to give effect. It also appealed to the strong academic element in the governing Labour Party, and to social scientists in the rapidly expanding universities who were keen to make themselves useful in affairs of state. Martin Minogue has gathered in the produce of the work of many distinguished labourers, and it is to be hoped that he has further volumes of this kind in preparation.

RAYMOND NOTTAGE

Self Reliance in Kenya: The Case of Harambee, PHILIP M. MBITHI and RASMUS RASMUSSON; *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala,* 1977; pp 177; Skr40, paperback; Skr70, hardback.

As the authors point out in their Foreword, anyone who seeks to understand development in Kenya 'will find it necessary to know something about Harambee self-help as a development strategy, a way of filling needs, and a way of working and living in Kenya'. Although the authors do not claim more than this, the book contains information and argument which may contribute to a better understanding of the factors which influence participative development generally, not merely in Kenya. The Foreword also indicates that this book is one of the outcomes of a nationwide survey of grass-roots Harambee self-help in which over sixty students of the Department of Sociology of the University of Nairobi and a few from the Department of Economics were actively involved and that the study was designed in close collaboration with them, especially those in their final year.

The book begins with a discussion of the background and environment of Harambee (pull together) and the authors outline two conceptual interpretations which they intend shall give the reader a deeper understanding of it. Chapter III comprises a short account of the research methodology. Chapters IV and V contain and discuss summaries of much of the statistical evidence which the study generated, the former being concerned with leadership patterns, the latter with contribution patterns in terms of cash and labour at local, provincial and national levels. These two chapters contain thirty-five of the fifty-four tables together with other statistical information with which the book is generously endowed. Chapter VI introduces some factors which the authors consider determine the viability of Harambee, with emphasis on three key concepts – perception, leadership and implementation. Also in this chapter are twenty-six case studies of self-help projects selected from thirteen districts. Chapter VII discusses local perceptions about Harambee – what needs it meets, why people contribute cash and/or labour and what benefits they perceive in the different projects. In a final brief chapter the authors indicate some central government policies which they consider might assist the development of the Harambee movement to increase national welfare. From the position of central planning they see Harambee as offering three major advantages over other forms of development – in mobilising otherwise inflexible resources, in transferring savings into investment with little resource losses and in drawing attention to and filling developmental gaps (ie introducing greater choice) in types of projects and scale of projects.

One of the main strengths of this study is that it attempts to analyse what local people, the people who are involved in and will be affected by self-help projects, think about local development, its leaders, the types of projects, their implementation and the results. In this respect one of my disappointments was that the case studies in Chapter VI were not written up in more detail, perhaps thereby giving more support to the conclusions reached. I would also have welcomed a more full discussion in the final chapter of the policy implications resulting from the findings of the study. Nevertheless, much information is available in short compass and there is not the slightest hint of 'padding'.

My main dissatisfaction with this book is with the language of parts of the first two chapters. It is not easy to translate much of the language used by economists and other social scientists into one which can be more readily understood by the non-academic reader and there is always the danger that simplification may lead to inaccuracy. Nevertheless, if a book of this kind is to have 'clout' as well as scholarship, it must be read and understood by those whom its authors hope to influence. Two of the principal actors in the development process of any country are the civil servant and the politician and there is constant reference to them in this study, but many of them might be deterred from reading beyond the first chapters because of some of the language. Whilst the authors do not address any particular audience there are many lessons in the book for civil servants and politicians and it would be unfortunate if a language barrier prevented them from reading it. Philip Mbithi was one of the contributors to an admirable little book "Rural Administration in Kenya", edited by David Leonard and dedicated to

'Kenya's Present and Future Civil Servants'. Mr. Mbithi's contribution to that publication, which is about Agricultural Extension as an Intervention Strategy, is a good example of a complex subject put across simply and clearly without detriment to its intellectual appeal. Some parts of Chapters I and II of this book could have been written in similar language with advantage to a wider audience.

My other main criticism is about the two maps which are used preceding the introduction. One shows the provinces, animal communities and ecological regions, the other the distribution of ethnic groups. They are taken from another book and the former will be unhelpful and unnecessarily complex especially for any reader who does not know Kenya well. Maps should be relevant and clear. Since Chapter VI contains comparative data about some of the factors determining the viability of Harambee, including case studies of twenty-six projects in thirteen Districts, it would have been useful if a map of the Districts could have been included, preferably on a scale fifty percent larger than that which was actually used.

There are, almost inevitably in a study which contains so much statistical evidence and comparative data, one or two inconsistencies between the data and the analysis. The collation of information compiled by almost seventy students must in itself have involved problems of interpretation and presentation. The authors should be commened, therefore, for their work in putting the material together and making it available in such a concise study.

COLIN FULLER

African Refugees and the Law, GORAN MELANDER, PETER NOBEL (Eds); *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies,* 1978; pp 98; Skr 25 soft, Skr 40 hard.

The Swedish concern for the internationally destitute or oppressed is well known. The Scandinavia Institute of African Studies at Uppsala has held a number of international conferences on refugee questions in Africa, and in 1979 a major conference will take place at Arusha. As part of the preparations for the 1979 meeting a seminar was last year held at Uppsala, on the Legal Aspects of the African Refugee Problem; and the proceedings are reported in this volume. It is stated that there are ten million refugees or displaced persons in the world. Figures for Africa are not given; but the evident extent of the phenomenon there may surprise those – like the writer of this review – who are not well acquainted with the facts, and may have unthinkingly assumed that the Palestinian is the only refugee with an urgent problem. The urgency has in his case lasted thirty years. One may hope that, after the next thirty years, lawyers will not still be cogitating over the African situation.

For the papers collected here demonstrate the legal uncertainties attending the problem, even the definition of 'refugee' being inadequate and subject to variable interpretations. The principal provisions of the three main international instruments are given in an appendix. These are the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol to the Convention, and the OAU Convention

Governing Specific Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Africa, signed in 1969 at Addis Ababa by 41 African States. The 1951 Convention – it has never applied to the Palestinian – was drafted with the European situation mainly in mind, and the refugee, to have the protection of its provisions, must be a person under a 'well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion'. For Africa the OAU Convention adds a further class: 'every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order . . . is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence'. Owing to the narrowness of the 1951 definition and its consequent failure to meet events as they later evolved, especially outside Europe, there has arisen a large class of non-Convention, though nonetheless deserving, de facto refugees. In any case, less than half the Member States of the United Nations have ratified the 1951 Convention, and only 18 out of 43 African States have ratified the OAU Convention.

Resulting difficulties, with the problem of 'refugees in orbit', ie unable to find a country which will give them asylum, are discussed in papers by legal advisers, past and present, to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and academic lawyers. A paper by a practising Swedish lawyer stresses the importance of enacting national legislation, in order to give 'universal principle and international law a firm footing and a way to function'. Few countries, it appears, have done this. If the law of the country is in conflict with the Conventions, the latter are of no help to the refugee. Botswana, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia are countries which have enacted laws explicitly dealing with refugees, Tanzania's Act being the most detailed. There is no general definition of refugee in the Act, but there is power to declare by order who are refugees. The paper does not outline model clauses; but minimum standards relating to the definition of a refugee, and for his protection and rights, are suggested. There should be a duty to the refugee to make his rights known to him.

Problems of political activity by refugees – propaganda, paramilitary, acts of violence, infiltration back – are faced. Time no doubt prevented a detailed consideration of many of the points. But all concerned with the difficult and grievous questions raised by the existence of vast numbers of refugees will be grateful for the initiative taken by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in promoting this legal seminar, and for publishing the thoughtful papers which resulted.

WILLIAM DALE

West African States: Failure and Promise, JOHN DUNN (Ed); *Cambridge University Press,* 1978; notes, index, pp 259; £12.50 (hardback), £4 00 (softback)

This is No: 23 in the steadily lengthening list of the monographs so admirably promoted by the African Studies Centre at Cambridge and published by CUP in its African Studies Series It is, as one would expect, most elegantly printed and bound

But the contents are not, alas, as elegant as the container There are seven essays on the recent political history of Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone. They are escorted by a scholarly and wittily donnish Introduction and Conclusion by John Dunn. When I read them I felt as if I was attending a seminar of exceedingly bright doctorands (forgive my Latin-American) being put through their paces by a slightly anxious supervisor on the eve of the defence of their theses. This gave rise to the temptation to give the candidates marks, a game for which I have no qualifications whatsoever. It is a temptation which I have resisted, though even an amateur spectator may perhaps be permitted to say that he was left unsatisfied by the contributions on Ghana and Nigeria (countries of which I have had a little first-hand experience) and was enthralled by R. W. Johnson's account of Sekou Touré's Guinea (a far-away country of which I knew nothing).

No, I did not really enjoy this menu. Perhaps I had expected too much from such cordon bleu chefs, perhaps there were too many of them and they got in each other's way. More likely, my old-fashioned palate was dulled by harsh neologisms like 'desertification', by infelicities like 'counterfactually', and by a great deal of "in-speak". (I am quite sure that Donal Cruise O'Brien does not know what a "parameter" is, much less ideological parameters within which constitutional amendments are defined.) I appreciate the need for some jargon in politico-scientific analysis, while continuing to deplore the necessity, but I felt strongly that much of the jargon used was inappropriate and indicated a sort of academic neo-colonialism.

But my queasiness went deeper than that. The Condé's remark came to mind: 'Ces coquins nous font parler et agir comme ills auraient fait eux-mêmes à notre place'. The contributors are certainly not 'coquins', but they do not seem to have made sufficient allowance for an inevitable 'ethnocentricity' of outlook. ('Failure and Promise'? Who the hell are you, Sir, writing end-of-term reports like this on us?). Nor have some of them rid themselves of idées fixes about the bourgeoisie, the working class and the peasantry, classifications which seem to me almost always inappropriate to the African scene. I was greatly puzzled to find trained historians so dismissive of long-term history (what, with Northern Ireland on our own doorstep?). Above all I was irked by the absence of an 'anthropological dimension'. (Come back, A. F. Robertson!). I have long been convinced that we shall never make much sense of what is going on in Africa unless we work hand-in-glove with the social anthropologists.

Well, there you are. Unless you are a Librarian, you won't be able to buy this book. But you should certainly borrow it as soon as you can. Don't be put off by this acidulous assessment. But keep the Bisodol tablets handy.

PETER CANHAM

Commodity Conflict, L. N. RANGARAJAN; *Croom Helm, London;* Index & Appendices; pp 390; £19.95.

In international negotiations, failure to achieve anything can be even more signifi-

cant in its repercussions than success. 'Commodity Conflict' analyses the issues surrounding the current, signally unpromising, set of international discussions initiated by resolution 93(IV) at UNCTAD in May 1976, setting out an Integrated Programme for Commodities whose central element is to be a Common Fund for financing stocks and other commodity-related measures. In the two years since then, the discussions on the 18 commodities and on the Common Fund have been reminiscent of the unwrapping of so many parcels around a Christmas Tree; one by one the wrapping paper has been discarded and in very few cases has there been anything substantial inside. The one exciting new toy – the International Sugar Agreement – seems unlikely to be in working order for long, given the heavy-handed way the EEC is playing this particular game. The whole exercise seems set to generate a great deal of needless ill will sooner or later – sooner if agreements are not reached – later if they turn out unworkable.

'Commodity Conflict' is a serious, well-written and constructive survey. It is written with politics, rather than economics in the foregound, as befits any realistic survey of international commodity negotiations. In his analysis of the facts of commodity trade, the author underlines the divergence between the ideology of competitive markets and the actual pervasive regulation and oligopoly with ample factual material and without forcing the very heterogeneous commodity markets that exist into an alternative stereotype.

The weak bargaining power of developing countries and their tendency to be pushed to the peripheries of the economic system are points frequently made (sometimes too strongly, as when it is implied that an increase of trade between developed countries harms developing countries because the former have 'increased their share of trade at the expense of the latter'). It is in this section that a stronger underpinning of economics would have been desirable. For the nature of markets and the divergence in bargaining power may determine whereabouts within a fairly wide range the price will settle, but these facts do not determine the limits of that range. The lower limit of any commodity price is set by the productive potential of the resources of land and labour that produce it in some alternative use. Thus if a Kenyan smallholder can grow 2 tons of maize on his land, no multi-national will be able to pay him a price for the tea grown on that land which will only buy him $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons of maize. The point (developed by Arthur Lewis in an essay on the origins of the existing international order) is of importance because it allows a realistic assessment of the chances that international action on commodities has of breaking into the vicious circle of poverty, given that unfavourable terms of trade are more a symptom than a cause of low productivity and income.

If the earlier chapters would be good reading for developed country negotiators, unaware of the force and urgency of the arguments put forward by developing countries in the commodity forum, the later chapters would be equally beneficial for developing country negotiators. The author shows the irrationality of turning buffer stocking, and a Common Fund to finance stocks, into the centrepiece of a set of negotiations on commodities, given the limited applicability of the technique and its irrelevance to issues other than short-term fluctuations. One of the curious

features of the integrated programme is that those aspects of commodity agreements which could actually benefit producers at the expense of consumers (quota restrictions) receive little attention (presumably because their implementation does not in principle require the agreement of consumers) compared with negotiations over providing resources for buffer-stocking schemes which cannot affect the price trend. While the political impetus behind the developing countries' approach derives from the objective of altering the trend level of price, the centre of attention and the bone of contention is a buffer-stocking mechanism which is irrelevant to this objective.

Mr Rangarajan also points out the difficulties inherent in the "group" approach as presently practised by developing countries in UNCTAD negotiations, which involves aggregating their demands into a package which contains something for each principle interest in the group in advance of the negotiations. The difficulties of altering this package in the course of negotiations without upsetting the delicate intra-group balance are almost insurmountable.

To harassed diplomats and politicians, wondering how the international community will ever be able to extricate itself without undue loss of dignity from the apparent cul-de-sac of the Integrated Programme, much of the interest in the book will reside in the final chapter, which suggests an alternative method of negotiation of commodity problems. This chapter may well already have been influential, since one of its main recommendations – a switch from focussing on the characteristics of commodities to focussing on particular countries, and the problems they face in commodity trade – already appears to have been adopted by UNCTAD in the organisation of its further work on commodities. Rangarajan's ideas for an Agreement on Commodity Trade (ideas which are off to a good start with a dynamic-sounding acronym) have much in common with the GATT, in that they would provide for a series of negotiating rounds in which individual countries present demands and offers relating to commodity trade; they differ from the GATT in that discrimination between countries would be the rule rather than the exception. While developing country solidarity would continue to be a main instrument for the bargaining power of developing countries, the 'aggregation' of developing country demands would take place towards the end of the bargaining process, with the aim of ensuring a satisfactorily balanced outcome, rather than at the outset, with the result of creating a non-negotiable basket of demands.

It is hard to answer the author's challenge to produce a better alternative to the ideas formulated in this final chapter; certainly almost any bargaining procedure would be preferable to what we have at present. But the ideas in this final chapter are disappointingly undeveloped, and it is rather hard to envisage what in practice would emerge from the kind of negotiations described, and how, for example it would be possible sequentially to take account of the different needs of various countries exporting a single commodity. One is left unhappy with the balance of the book; if the intention was to put forward proposals, much more space should have been devoted to their exposition, while if the intention was to give an analytical and factual account of commodity negotiations, the final chapter seems out of

place. In that context, what might have emerged from such an account would be a more cautious assessment of the durability and practicability of commodity measures, and of their scope, even if they work as planned, for contributing to a solution of the problems of poverty.

C. E. YOUNG

North of South; An African Journey, SHIVA NAIPAUL; *Andre Deutsch, London* pp 252; £6.50.

The sharp and penetrating eye of a novelist from Trinidad examines Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia and finds practice far removed from the precepts that have been preached by the national leaders in the post-independence era. I for one was reluctant to put down this book which I found by turns witty, provocative, perverse and, alas, sometimes all too true.

Shiva Naipaul is really presenting us with a travelogue with which he merges material from Elspeth Huxley's novels, from Karen Van Blixen, and from contemporary authors, with the facts as he saw them on his journey. But where one asks is the line to be drawn between the true picture and the caricature? Does the novelist-traveller succumb to the temptation to exaggerate his characters? Can the Indians so cruelly painted as Mr Singh his fellow traveller, or Mr Lalji of Mbeya, really behave and talk as pathetically as he describes? Is there not some flaw here where an author finds it all too easy to paint his fellow Indians in the most deplorable and shameful light?

There are tourists who 'do' London, Shakespeare's Stratford, Stonehenge and more all in a week or less package tour – a few then write up their visit and hitting some nails on the head and missing others widely, they can raise laughs by drawing attention to some of the odder characteristics of the natives that they have come across, and if they are shrewd and write well, then their journey can prove itself quite profitable. This is very similar.

What this reviewer finds very hard to accept is the manner in which old-timers and newcomers from Europe and North America are portrayed in the Seventies as denigrating the Africans they have met, or alternatively fawning upon them. Some of the language sounds as if it comes from a novel of the early twenties, or from groups of South African Nationalists. With more than a quarter of a century in Tanzania, straddling independence, the reviewer has met plenty of strange people of all races but never any who spoke or behaved quite like some of those who, so it seems, Shiva Naipaul kept encountering – were any of them perhaps the outcome of malaria's delirium or possibly emerged out of ignorance of kiswahili? certainly there is little mention of the ordinary man in the street, behaving normally. Perhaps he was gullible and too easily teased. Nonetheless this is a very readable travelogue: it should be enjoyed for its entertainment value and not taken too seriously since the admix of fact and fantasy, caricature and portraiture is glued too inseparably, albeit making a lively if not infrequently distasteful blend of personalised writing.

Certainly the author demolishes a lot of socialist cant and hypocrisy but nowhere, alas, does he suggest where the road lies for the East African peasantry to seek a better way of life. It is easy to be critical: poor countries have no easy existence and their Governments merit sympathy rather than contempt.

How far one asks, have East African bureaucrats been able to laugh at themselves as they are here portrayed or has the author's name been blacklisted for future 'no admittance' – that perhaps should be the test as to whether a lot of his cynical comments are justified.

P.H.J.

British Administration in Nigeria, 1900-1950: a Nigerian View; I. M. Okonjo; *NOK Publishers, New York,* 1974; index; notes; pp 390; £5.50.

For some years now this reviewer has been making a plea for Africa's bureaucrats to follow the example of their Asian counterparts and write about their experience of what it was like to be an administrator, first as a junior, then as an equal, and finally as a senior to their European colleagues in the decolonizing decades of the 1950's and 1960's. Dr Okonjo comes close to satisfying part of this appeal. Though this is no retrospective personal memoir, it is an insider's, and a Nigerian's, view on Britiish colonial administration. By virtue of his office as the one-time head of the civil service in the Mid-West State of Nigeria, Dr Okonjo meets at least two of the criteria sought in such a plea: he writes as a practising administrator and as one who was in the civil service before independence. The third he eschews, preferring to write an analysis of British colonial administration up to the beginning of active party politics and before the period of vigorous nationalism rather than considering his own role and perceptions while serving under two masters from administrative cadet to Secretary to the Military Government. A generous state government gave him a year off to complete his London PhD (he quotes Professor Anderson's estimate of his thesis), a sabbatical 'quite unprecedented' for a serving administrator, he claims, though without complete accuracy. As Professor Dike puts it in his foreword, here is an example of the scholar as a man of action.

Dr Okonjo's aim is, he assures us, to state the facts as they appear from the records. Finding previous studies limited or full of holes (he cites three of the most recent, those by I. F. Nicolson, R. Heussler and B. Sharwood Smith, dismissively) and claims for his own study the status of being 'the first work . . . on this subject to be based on a throroughgoing search of the records' in the Colonial Offices Public Records Office and in the Nigerian archives and Secretariat files. While many scholars may query Dr Okonjo's attitude of infallibility towards official minutes and memoranda – 'the archives speak remorselessly, without fear or favour' – his heart is in the right place for a researcher. It is as 'a contribution to the growing literature on the history of public administration in Nigeria in the strictly colonial period' that his book must be judged.

In six historical chapters, Dr Okonjo takes us through indirect rule in Northern

Nigeria and what he, following Lugard and damning Nigerian sensitivities, identifies as 'the collapse of Southern Nigeria's administration'. A welcome whole chapter is devoted to Clifford, 'the Unconforming Governor', currently the overdue focus of at least three biographical pens. Echoing consciously or not Margery Perham's chapter headings, he then gives us short period chapters entitled 'Southern Provinces Intractability' and 'Northern Nigeria Separatism', he advances to a close study of the 1931-1934 reforms, when Cameron was unmistakably at the helm. Then, with three-quarters of the book written but barely half the years covered, the years from 1935 to 1950 have to be taken at something of a gallop, leaving the rider (or is he still the reader?) breathless and discontented. To complete the confusion, the final chapter of narrative ignores the title of the book and promises to take the story no further than 1947.

In compensation for his lack of balance, the work is full of acute and balanced observations. These are well-researched. However, Dr Okonjo's enviable access to official papers in the Secretariat files is on occasion vitiated by his tantalising coyness over indicating his sources – footnotes 12 and 22 on Chapter V are but the tip of, as it were, an infuriating and unscholarly iceberg. The scant bibliography, presented in a highly unprofessional manner, is retrieved by the excellent biographical sketches of the twenty-four leading colonial officials who dominate Dr Okonjo's story (except what kind of order, if any, are they meant to be in?). For a civil service that has quite a name for its record of musical-chair postings, Dr Okonjo allows himself to be too easily surprised by the principle of inter-colonial transfers which he mentions at page 374.

Those who believe this to be just the polishing up of his dissertation will be misled. It is more than this, though maybe it is the American experience which also accounts for Dr Okonjo's decline from thesis objectivity when he 'had his eyes opened' at Wisconsin – not excluding hostile comments on American scholars, too! *Per contra*, Dr Okonjo knows enough about Nigerian administration to reject Nicolson's intemperate presentation of Lugard's work. Clearly Dr Okonjo is a fast worker: nine chapters in three months, he tells us. Clearly, too, he enjoyed infinitely more backstopping support than the average scholar: the whole MS was typed in under eight weeks, by 'naturally' (sic!) a squad of 'several' Ministry typists, and even 'a team' of readers were put to work on it, led by one Staff Grade and two District Officers! This being so, all the sadder the way they let their boss down over the matter of proof reading of typescript and/or galleys: Borno for Borneo, Baddelley and Baddeley for Badaeley, L. Machpherson for MacPherson, Passfied for Passfield, Arthue for Arthur Creech Jones, and so sickeningly on.

What does all this add up to? In brief, this Journal would not wish to review a book published as long ago as 1974 were it not of the opinion that here was a work deserving more attention than it has yet earned. No earthshaker, it has much to attract the *aficionado*. With the exception of J. J. White's thesis, regrettably still unpublished, this is one of the few studies to pay attention to the not-so-stagnant inter-war era of Nigerian administration and it has a look about it of holding the

field thereon for some time to come. Minor cavils apart, my main hope is to meet Dr Okonjo soon and elicit from him the exact sources for some of his more exciting remarks, eg the comment of the Chief Secretary, Lagos, on kicking H. R. Palmer upstairs to a governorship: 'why reward him and do grave injustice to fifty better men?'

A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE

Book Notes

Local Government and Development in Kenya, W. OUMA OYUGI; *Discussion Paper published by The Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex;* pp 35.

Ouma Oyugi has managed, in remarkably few pages, to provide an admirable introduction to local government in Kenya. The historical background is well and clearly set out: financially local Native Councils did not have the power to utilise their own funds; this rested in the hands of central government officials, yet at the same time Central Government granted them no funds direct, so that the poor stagnated and the rich 'developed'. Their replacement in 1950 by African District Councils was a sign of progress for with a new status came the obligation to provide social services.

As the author points out, however, the apparent stability of the new system was on the surface only. Services, wages in particular, were pegged low. Once Independence came, the crunch followed. Salary revision, particularly that of teachers without a comparable increase in Central Government grants, meant inadequate services and a lack of Central Government confidence in local government capacity. Deficit spending could maintain services temporarily, and government grants could come to the rescue: be good, balance your budget and no reward by way of grants would be forthcoming.

Where, as in Kenya, increased financial impositions without increased financial assistance, are imposed on local authorities, the system must fail. Central Government removed education, road and health services to the Centre, but at the same time abolished the Graduated Poll Tax, the main source of local Government revenue. Sadly the author concludes that 'Kenya's rural local authorities . . . cannot justify their existence in terms of the services they offer to the people'.

Changing Patterns of Civilian-Military Relations in the Sudan MUDDATHIR ABDEL-RAHIM; *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies,* 1978; pp 32, Skr 10.

This is Research Report No 46 from the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies at Uppsala. This is very short, very well written, and in the light of its brevity, remarkably clear and concise. An excellent picture is presented of the historical background to General Nimairy's coup and how he set out to settle the South Sudan problem, survived counter coups and consolidated his personal position.

ODI Review - No 1 1978; *Overseas Development Institute, London;* £3.20 (annual subscription for 2 issues £6.00).

This bi-annual ODI Review is well worth its not inconsiderable cost.

Judith Hart fields with considerable political acumen the mainly economic questions put to her by ODI: on Lomé and Stabex she is of course on 'home' ground. Douglas Williams recently retired liberal ODM deputy-secretary writes with the honesty one would expect, on Human Rights and the Third World - he advocates the withholding of concessional funds from states guilty of savage breaches.

The best article is probably that by A. K. Bos on Food Aid by the EEC - too little, too procedurally involved, inadequately controlled, bi-lateral funds required unnecessarily, most seriously affected countries do not obtain a sufficient proportion of food aid, etc.

John Howell asks 'What's wrong with managers' - don't we all? this is no Third World problem, it is common to almost all countries. Stephen Sandford writes interestingly about pastoralists (is the traditional pastoralism of Botswana

really disappearing?) - but does not face up to the real question which is whether as the twenty-first century approaches there is still a place in our crowded world for those who wish to follow a pastoral way of life.

Superpower Intervention in the Middle East, PETER MANGOLD; *Croom Helm, London;* pp 209; £7.50.

The great powers once occupied areas of the Middle East, once held areas under League of Nations Mandate, now with no physical presence, they seek to influence events from the outside by the supply of diplomatic pressures, arms, exhortation: even the use of force has been tried. Yet, the Middle East remains the world's greatest tinder-box; Israel surrounded by hostile Arab States, Palestinians homeless and in exile. Peter Mangold sets out to show how the superpowers have tried to effect a balance of power which hopefully would help to avoid a Fourth World War. To a considerable extent this book provides a very interesting study of Dr Kissinger's efforts to maintain peace in the Middle East.

The Demise of a Rural Economy, STEPHEN GUDEMAN; *Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,* 1978; bibliography and index; pp 176; £6.95 cloth edition; £3.75 paperback.

This is the story of a village in the Republic of Panama, when the transition from subsistence to cash-cropping transformed the local economy, in the author's view to the detriment of the villagers. It is usual to read of subsistence farming as the yoke holding the peasants to an insufficiently productive soil, and the development of a cash crop as the beginning of a new era of hope and modest prosperity. Perhaps it is the way that the Panamanian sugar mill is managed that really disturbs the author and upsets the local people. How far one wonders, must an unsatisfactory state of affairs continue; is there no room for compromise where a mixed agricultural economy would allow for a cash crop of sugar and rice and maize as the people's staple food crops?

The Nuclear Axis, ZDENEK CERVENKA and BARBARA ROGERS; *Julien Friedmann Books;* illustrations, tables, maps, index; pp 464; £7.95.

The authors say it is evident that South Africa could make a nuclear bomb and has been preparing a Kalahari Desert testing site for a long time. However, as they point out, it is not clear that a white minority-rule government could survive, even with nuclear weapons, 'if its economy continues to deteriorate and international money-markets remain largely closed to it' and if, it might be added, an increasing number of the white minority begins to appreciate the vile nature of their government's apartheid, racist ways.

The Indonesian Tragedy, BRIAN MAY; *Routledge and Kegan Paul,* 1978; illustrated; index; pp 438; £8.95.

Brian May is an experienced Australian journalist who spent four years in Indonesia. He is shrewd and writes well. He is not, however, an academic researcher and so rather too readily resorts to the use of the adjectival innuendo where conjecture not evidence is the grounds (which may be well-founded) of critical comment on the Suharto regime.

The author is rather too emotively pro-Sukarno and anti-Suharto; his sympathies for the founding father of independent Indonesia are most creditable, but it does not make for good history to accuse on slender grounds that which one rejects almost with contempt when preferred by another party.

This said, Brian May's book is overall a well compiled and very readable account of the politics of modern Indonesia: not without bias, but clearly written with deep sincerity it amounts to a very stern indictment of the present Military regime and one cannot but see the relevance of the question which is posed as to whether the AID which the West is providing is properly directed, wisely chosen or in the long term to the advantage of Indonesia or the good repute of the West.

To student and general reader alike this is a well presented if sorry picture of one of the Third World's largest new states, potentially rich but, now alas, explosively volatile with an ever increasing population and all too little social development.

Law Order and Politics in West Germany, SEBASTIAN COBLER; *Penguin Books;* pp 223, 90p.

The author does not like the West German Government nor its methods, but if one is seriously to evaluate the post-Hitler era, one should do so fairly and compare the two Germanies, and then perhaps one

might see where lies the greater freedom and ask perhaps who built the wall.

Studies in Nigerian Administration; D. J. MURRAY (Ed); *Hutchinson, 2nd edition,* 1978; index; pp 342; £3.75.

Professor Murray's useful collection of essays on Nigerian administration in contemporary action was published in 1970 and reviewed in this journal in the issue for July 1971. Given the continued interest in public administration in Africa, the publishers have now found it worthwhile to reissue the volume, this time in paperback only, and to include twenty pages of additional material. This takes the form of a postscript by Dr Adamolekun, a former pupil of Murray's and now head of the department of public administration at the University of Ife. In his postscript Adamolekun briefly discusses some of the developments in *post-bellum* Nigerian administration (Udoji, public enterprises, state and local government etc). The publishers are to be congratulated on including references to the new material in the index, though Dr Adamolekun's academic qualifications in the contents also deserve updating from his status at page 1 to that at page 310. The dustjacket suggests that this reprint is the first volume in a new Hutchinson University Library for Africa aimed at the tertiary level.

Printed in England for HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
by Adams & Sons (Printers) Ltd., East Street, Hereford
Dd 595906 K14 10/78

The Quarterly Journal of Administration

(The Quarterly Review of the Faculty of Administration, University of Ife, Ile Ife, Nigeria)

The Quarterly Journal of Administration which started publication in October 1966, is devoted to the study, research, dissemination and exchange of knowledge and information on all aspects of administration and management in the developing countries in particular and the rest of the world in general. It is published in October, January, April and July of each year.

It is addressed to higher civil servants, officials of statutory corporations and local authorities, and for business executives as well as for students and scholars of administration and management. It is the only Journal dealing extensively with local administrative and managerial problems in Africa.

Subscription Rates

	By Surface Mail		*By Airmail*	
	Annual	*Single issue*	*Annual*	*Single issue*
Nigeria	N5.00	N1.50	—	—
Other Countries	N8.40 (US $13.50) (UK £7.00)	N2.40 (US $3.90) (UK £2.10)	N13.20 (US $21.30) (UK £11.40)	N3.60 (US $6.00) (UK £3.20)

Contributions, subscriptions and advertisements should be addressed to:

The Editor
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATION
Faculty of Administration
University of Ife
ILE-IFE, NIGERIA

ISBN 0 11 724729 4
ISSN 0021 - 8472